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Introduction 
 
 
This paper starts from the assumption that there are two basic scenarios for the future of an enlarged Euro-
pean Union in the Tsunami world system. One is an enlarged EU that would be a global challenger, a 
scenario which would amount to the repetition of the cycles of global challenges, this time on the 
part of the European Union. Such a scenario might sound very distant at the moment, both culturally and 
politically, but it would correspond to the logic of world capitalism over the last 500 years, re-analyzed in 
this paper. Although such a scenario is not applicable to the present EU-15 or, at any rate, an EU-15, 
enlarged by the two island economies of Malta and Cyprus, and the present 10 Central and East European 
candidate countries, an EU comprising up to 40 nations of the third and fourth enlargement wave indeed 
would be a major change in the structure of the international system and could be driven by its own internal 
deficient dynamics, characterized by low innovation and high government spending, and by the pressures of 
the world system, into such a position. Again, the European landmass, united under one leadership, would 
then be in the challenging position, - as happened under the Hapsburgs, the French under Richelieu and later 
under Napoleon, and under Germany in World War I and II, while the dynamics of flexible, sea-power ori-
ented world leadership again would be happening somewhere else. 14 hypotheses, presented here, speak in 
favor of such a pessimistic scenario. 
 
A large section of the paper is thus dedicated to show, that a global challenge option - which might be im-
plicit in the thinking behind the trilateral competition between Europe, America, and Asia - is not only not 
feasible, but that it is world politically dangerous. A second scenario is the European Union as the driving 
force behind a movement towards global governance, the only and reasonable alternative to the workings of 
the capitalist world system and it’s tendencies towards inequality and conflict. This scenario is the policy-
option and practical end-result of the assessment of future trends in the world system, presented by Boswell 
and Chase-Dunn (2000). Although there is wide agreement in the literature on the need of a transition of the 
world system to a system of global governance (see Kiljunen, 2000, in this volume), the ways to achieve this 
are more or less a theme for speculation. In their world-systems-based analysis of the spiral of capitalism 
and socialism, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (1999) arrive at the conclusion that the European Union would be 
best fitted to become an engine of socially progressive transformation of the world system. Such an analysis 
would find lots of sympathy among labor-oriented or social-movement oriented circles on both sides of the 
Atlantic and beyond, and is also reflected in various other ‘denominations’ of the world systems profession, 
like in the statements by Samir Amin, who - although very critical of the Union in its present form - speaks 
about the necessity for Europe to become an alternative pole in the world economy, characterized by the 
tendencies towards unfettered globalization. 
 
Our first scenario is somber in nature, it enjoys a high kind of probability, and it has dire consequences. It 
shows that there is a recurrent, and shortening cycle of conflict in the international system, linked to the long 
cycles of economics and politics. According to Arrighi, the usual, recurrent slumps in the long, fifty year eco-
nomic (Kondratieff) cycles are called signal crises; while the interaction between the end of hegemonies 
(1340, 1560, 1750 and 1930) and the regular Kondratieff slumps are called terminal crises or - Tsunami 
waves, because they have catastrophic and devastating effects on the world system and have a high prob-
ability of leading - in a shortening time period - to major power wars. Our analysis first shows, that the dan-
ger of such a more, but not too distant, Tsunami cataclysm after 2030 is real. First of all, the social conse-
quences of the ongoing phase of globalization already have the character of a Tsunami wave in itself. This 
leads us to expect sharper and even deeper social effects, should a terminal crisis - like during the 1930s - 
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hit the world economy again. The present phase of globalization is but the continuation of earlier globalization 
tendencies in the world system before the major power wars. Our analysis shows that the European Union 
repeats the errors of the import-substitution policies like those in Latin America in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, so well known to dependencia theory, and becomes - like Brazil at that time - a technologically very 
dependent zone of the world economy. Europe is also facing the danger of repeating the fatal errors of the 
land-mass based attempts at world systems hegemony, like Venice, the Hapsburgs, France and Germany. 
The societal and economic contradictions of technological dependence and rent-seeking interact and in-
crease, most probably leading towards a deepening of the unequal relations between the European center 
and the European periphery. Migration from the periphery to Europe, partially the result of these unequal 
exchange mechanisms with the European center, will increase the adaptation and globalization pressure on 
the European economy. Unlike America, whose economy is more open and thus adapts itself to migration 
much faster, Europe’s structures are too inflexible and technologically dependent. The predicted downward 
cycle of the European position in the world system threatens to lead to a more assertive and authoritarian 
pattern of action vis-à-vis migration and vis-à-vis the other big trading blocs. The increasing societal role of 
corruption and organized crime as well as the lack of democracy within the European Union will increase, 
and not decrease with EU enlargement.  
 
Our assessment of the alternative that Europe could present in the transformation of the world towards a 
more humane and global governance should thus contribute to showing the dangers of a repetition of the 
hegemonial challenge scenario, that already was practiced by the Hapsburgs, by France and by Germany. A 
scenario, that was characterized each time by the combination of  
 
protectionism + imperialism. 
 
An imperial path for a United Europe would be the last thing, that the world needs, although there are - from 
past experiences - lots of indicators that would warn us, that Europe will follow precisely this path. Social 
science has the imperative to face up to existing dangers: thus, an early socio-liberal and democratizing re-
form of the European Union would be the (last) alternative to renewed global power rivalry, and conflict in 
the 21st Century, involving the European landmass. 
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The Tsunami social effects of globalization 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Turbo capitalism already has the devastating force of a Tsunami wave 
 
 
No question that the world economy is characterized at present, as happened in earlier periods, by a quanti-
tative and qualitative jump in the degree of globalization (Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 
2000). Luttwak defines this present phase as ‘turbo capitalism’ by private enterprise, liberated from gov-
ernment regulation, unchecked by effective trade unions, unfettered by concerns for employees or communi-
ties, and unhindered by taxation or investment restrictions. Much has been written on globalization over re-
cent years, but clear-cut estimates of the social effects of globalization over the last decades are rather ab-
sent from the literature. We think, that it is fair to assume the following tendencies: First, there is a tendency 
towards rising poverty on a global scale, especially after the Asian crash of 1997. Secondly, the introduction 
of capitalist development in East Central Europe and the former USSR brought about 9.7 million excess 
mortality cases in the region (UNDP, 1999, based on research by Giovanni Cornia from WIDER). Vulner-
abilities go hand in hand with the openings of markets. Thirdly, there was a real impoverishment in the world 
from 1988 to 1993. The following Table is based on Branko Milanovic’s calculation of the effects of chang-
ing income distribution patterns on real household per capita incomes in about 100 countries of the world: 
 
Table 1: absolute impoverishment, 1988 - 1993 
 
world income group (per-
centile) 
 
income 1988 in $ 
PPP 
income 1993 in $ 
PPP 
 
Ratio 2:1 
5 277,4 238,1 85,8 
10 348,3 318,1 91,3 
15 417,5 372,9 89,3 
20 486,1 432,1 88,9 
25 558,3 495,8 88,8 
30 633,2 586 92,5 
35 714,5 657,7 92,1 
40 802,7 741,9 92,4 
45 908,3 883,2 97,2 
50 1047,5 1044,1 99,7 
55 1314,4 1164,9 88,6 
60 1522,7 1505 98,8 
65 1898,9 1856,8 97,8 
70 2698,5 2326,8 86,2 
75 3597 3005,6 83,6 
80 4370 4508,1 103,2 
85 5998,9 6563,3 109,4 
90 8044 9109,8 113,2 
95 11518,4 13240,7 115 
99 20773,2 24447,1 117,7 
 
Source: Branko Milanovic, World Bank, 2000 
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Milanovic’s data can also be presented in a graphical fashion: only 1/5 of the world population had rising real 
incomes since the onslaught of turbo-capitalism, while 1/2 impoverished and the rest struggled to get along or 
saw reductions in their absolute incomes: 
 
Graph 1: only 20% of the world population really gain from globalization 
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Source: our own compilations from Branko Milanovic, 2000 
 
Adherents of turbo-capitalism thus are confronted with the fact, that 4/5 of humankind impoverished in real 
terms from 1988-1993 and most probably, beyond. Four, also the University of Texas Inequality Project 
for inequality in over 70 countries of the world since 1963 shows that the 1990s brought along a huge in-
crease in inequality, as measured by the Theil Index of Inequality of Sectoral Incomes: 
 
Graph 2: globalization increases inequality 
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Source: our own compilation from University of Texas Inequality Project, University of Texas at Austin, 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/ 
For further notes on the Theil measure  of inequality: 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/methods/measure.htm 
http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Paper/papers/9614.htm 
 
 
Fifth there is a tendency towards an increase in poverty on a truly global scale - in every geographic region 
of the former ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ World absolute poverty increased from 1996 to 1998: 
 
Table 2: World Poverty: the number of people living on less than 2 $ per day and capita increased sharply 
due to the crash economy of the 1990s 
 
 E Asia + 
Pacific 
Eastern 
Europe 
+Central 
Asia 
 
Latin Amer-
ica 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
 
South Asia Sub Saharan 
Africa 
China 
1996 236,3 92,7 179,8 60,6 1069,5 457,7 627,6 
1998 260,1 92,9 182,9 62,4 1095,9 474,8 632,1 
 
 
Thus, it is fair to assume that turbo-capitalism meant increasing poverty on a global scale in the former ‘Sec-
ond’ and ‘Third World’.  
 
In the industrialized countries, however, there are - as point number six - rather mixed tendencies at work, 
with inequality shaping markedly the leading countries of the ‘Washington consensus’. 
 
Table 3: income concentration in the leading countries of the Washington consensus 
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 richest 20% to poo-
rest 20% now 
richest 20% to poorest 
20% years ago 
 
change in the 
top/bottom ratio 
New Zealand 17,40 8,80 8,60 
USA 8,90 8,90 0,00 
Australia 7,00 9,60 -2,60 
United Kingdom 6,50 6,80 -0,30 
Ireland 6,40  
Israel 6,20 6,60 -0,40 
Portugal 5,90  
Switzerland 5,80 8,60 -2,80 
France 5,60  
Netherlands 5,50 5,60 -0,10 
Spain 5,40 5,80 -0,40 
Greece 5,40  
Canada 5,20 7,10 -1,90 
Germany 4,70 5,70 -1,00 
Italy 4,20 6,00 -1,80 
Luxembourg 3,90  
Norway 3,70 5,90 -2,20 
Sweden 3,60 4,60 -1,00 
Belgium 3,60 4,60 -1,00 
Finland 3,60 6,00 -2,40 
Denmark 3,60 7,10 -3,50 
Japan 3,40 4,30 -0,90 
Austria 3,20  
 
Legend: our own compilations from UNDP Human Development Reports, 1993 - 2000 
 
In the United States, real hourly wages for all employees fell by 12% between 1973 and 1990 and remained 
flat throughout the boom of the 1990s. Longer working years, a rising inequality between the skilled and the 
unskilled, and a higher labor market turnover rate characterize the American ‘miracle’, that, in the end, 
means above all an increased wealth of the top 20% of the population (R. A. Walker, 1999).  
 
Long cycle literature tells us, why there is a recurrent pattern of instability of social orders at the level of na-
tional societies and at the level of the international system. Long cycle literature would presume that espe-
cially out of a situation that is comparable to the de-regulatory and internationally polarizing globalization 
phases of the mid 1700s and mid 1800s, the evolution of a global challenge situation in the international sys-
tem by the protectionist and technologically dependent losers would be the most probable outcome. Follow-
ing this logic, there would be a danger, that large parts of Europe still would have to implement a large part 
of the agenda of the ‘Washington consensus’, which would make more authoritarian patterns, to be com-
bined with the global challenging position, all the more likely. Thus, our scenario ‘A’ shows the logic and the 
dangers of such a global challenge situation, and also analyzes the European perspectives under such a sce-
nario. 
 
 
The logic of past and future global conflict 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: there is a Tsunami war cycle of 100 to 150 years length 
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Globalization theory (see Kiljunen, 2000, in this volume) assumes that global governance must become the 
answer to the tendencies of polarization and poverty described above. Global conflict theory answers by 
saying that without global governance and peace mechanisms, the world system would threaten to drift back 
into deadly cycles of hegemonial challenge and global wars. History does not end, thus, only flags have 
changed. According to Goldstein’s empirical analysis in particular (1988), the capitalist world systems tends 
continuously towards wars and violent conflicts. Although such assumptions and theses are quite common in 
long-wave research, a thorough re-analysis of the original data presented by Goldstein is carried out here, 
especially to test the validity of polynomial trends as applied to the original, untransformed data series on 
economic (industrial) growth and battle fatalaties from major power wars. We thus demonstrate that there is 
an inherent logic of conflict in the international capitalist system since 1450. Future research might also ex-
plore the wealth of data presented in such documentary sites as the ‘Global Financial Data’ website 
(http://www.globalfindata.com/) and other data resources, mentioned by the Longwave Press homepage at 
http://www.1-888.com/longwave/sd.html. For the purposes of the present research paper, the re-analysis of 
the Goldstein data seems to be sufficient. 
 
Graph 3: The Tsunamis of global war. Tendencies of the capitalist world economy towards conflict cycles 
and Kondratieff cycles 
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Legend: y-axis: economic growth (left hand scale) and war intensity (right-hand scale) in the world economy. 
x-axis: passage of time since the beginning of a cycle. For the economic cycles, moving 9-year averages, 
calculated with EXCEL 5.0 from Goldstein’s orginal data. War intensity = nat. logarithm from (1 + battle 
fatalities from great-power wars ^0.10) 
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The tendency towards war in the capitalist world economy, 1495-1975
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Legend: y-axis: war intensity in the world economy. x-axis: passage of time since the beginning of a cycle. 
Calculated with EXCEL 5.0 from Goldstein’s orginal data. War intensity = nat. logarithm from (1 + battle 
fatalities from great-power wars ^0.10) 
 
The recurrence of major power wars in the capitalist world economy from 1495 to the present is one of the 
most intriguing features of the existing international system. The x-axis in Graph 3 presents the number of 
years after the end of the major power wars, i.e. 1648, 1816, and 1945. Each world political cycle up to 
now corresponded to a ‘W’-pattern of untransformed annual battle fatalities from major power wars in 
thousands. The war cycle 1495-1648 is a polynomial expression of the 6th order; R^2 is 91.7%; 1649-1816 
yields an R^2 of 33.6%; while a polynomial expression of the 6th order explains 50.1% of war intensity 
1817-1945. The international system is characterized according to Goldstein by the following sequence of 
cycles 
 
global war à  world hegemony of the dominant power à  de-legitimization of the international or-
der à  de-concentration of the global system à  global war et cetera 
 
The duration of these phases of the international order is approximately one Kondratieff cycle each, so the 
unit of time of the international system can be symbolized by the expression 1K. 
 
 
Graph 4: The war cycles from 1495 to 1975 
 
1495-1648 - the evolution of the Hapsburg versus rest constellation 
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y = war intensity (untransformed) 
 
1649-1816 - the evolution of the France versus rest constellation 
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y = war intensity (untransformed) 
 
 
1817-1945 - the evolution of the Germany versus rest constellation 
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y = war intensity (untransformed) 
 
1946 - the evolution of a European landmass versus rest constellation? 
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Legend for all the above graphs: x-axis: years; y-axis: annual battle fatalities from major great power wars in 
thousands 
 
As it is well known in world systems research, each such long cycle of world politics is characterized, ac-
cording to Modelski, by a dominant world economic power and its challenger. Goldstein and Modelski de-
scribed these world political cycles in great detail, so there is no need to repeat their reasoning here. The 
simple statistical evidence to support Goldstein’s theory on the basis of his own original data is surprising, 
though. Our tests use a very common software, available on millions of home micro-computers around the 
world (the EXCEL 5.0 program). The R^2 for the test series is between 31% and 91%; no transformation of 
the data was needed. The W-structure of conflict emerges clearly from all the tests. And each time, the chal-
lengers for world hegemony of a dominant seapower were members of the former winning, ruling coalition 
from a preceding major global war (France during the Thirty Years War, Germany during the Napoleonic 
Wars, Russia + China - or a very much enlarged European Union - during the Second World War), while 
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the challengers in the world wars (Thirty Years War, Napoleonic Wars, German Wars of our century) al-
ways were continental powers (the Hapsburgs, France, Germany) (see also: Modelski, 1987; Goldstein, 
1988). 
 
 
Capitalist instability on a global scale 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: signal crises (Kuznets and Kondratieff cycles) characterize capitalism 
 
 
The construction of theories on cyclical trends in the world economy are certainly not absent from a very 
long tradition of scholarship in political economy, beginning with Kuznets and Schumpeter. The very logic of 
industrial processes and basic innovations, as well as the societal models, connected with them, would sug-
gest to build cyclical fluctuations into more general theories of development (Amin, 1997). Blast furnaces and 
other important components of the industrial process, too, have a certain life-cycle, comparable with the 
Juglar and Kuznets cycle, just as technical innovations are scattered in a non-random fashion along time, 
coinciding with the Kondratieff cycle (Bornschier, 1988; for a very comprehensive summary Scandella, 
1998). There are short term instabilities of 3 to 5 years (Kitchin cycles), 8-11 years (Juglar cycles), 18-22 
years (Kuznets cycles), and these longer, 40-60 year Kondratieff waves.  
 
Although references to such theories abound, it is hard to convince the ‘non-believers’ in the social science 
profession that longer cycles, especially Kondratieff waves, exist. It should be kept in mind, that - in contrast 
to the real Kuznets cycles - Kondratieff waves are more often than not, mere tendencies, and are interrupted 
by the very marked ups and downs of the shorter, Kuznets cycles.  
 
A word should also be said about our data series. As in the well-known Cambridge lecture series of Ernest 
Mandel (1995), our data series is based on the two Kuczynski/Kleinknecht/Goldstein world industrial 
production time series, elaborated by Goldstein (1988), augmented by data, presented in Tausch (1998) for 
the post 1975 period. Since 1975, we used UN ECE Economic Survey of Europe, IFRI data (world GDP 
growth) and IMF World Economic Outlook data (for OECD country growth as a proxy for world devel-
opment. We are aware of the fact, that such time series are only estimates of the underlying, real fluctuations, 
and that all such data series are open to far-reaching criticisms and debates. Comparison with other data 
series, like the Internet data series by Terry Laundry, and other freely available Web materials 
(http://csf.colorado.edu/longwaves/ and also http://www.globalfindata.com/), must take into account, that our 
data are real production data and not data describing prices or stock market values. 
 
Let Xtn+1 be the index value of world production for tn+1; Xtn index value of world production for tn 
 
then 
 
    Xtn+1 
(1) growth =  _______ - 1 
    Xtn 
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For the post-1975 data on OECD country economic growth we used UN ECE; Fischer Weltalmanach, and 
Tausch, 1998. X is the time axis.  
 
The results for the Kuznets type fluctuations of the untransformed growth rates are: 
 
Table 3: Kuznets cycles since 1740 
 
1741-1756; R^2 = 23.5% 
1756-1774; R^2 = 36.1% 
1774-1793; R^2 = 34.8% 
1793-1812; R^2 = 39.7% 
1812-1832; R^2 = 16.4% 
1832-1862; R^2 = 25.7% 
1862-1885; R^2 = 36.3% 
1885-1908; R^2 = 56.2% 
1908-1932; R^2 = 44.2% 
1932-1958; R^2 = 19.1% 
1958-1975; R^2 = 68.8% 
1975-1992; R^2 = 66.2% 
 
Various methods will be used here to present Goldstein’s augmented data-series as Kondratieff cycles: 
 
Graph 5: The long waves of growth and recession since 1740 - 10 year (decade) averages 
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Legend: average, decade-long growth rates 1740 - 1990 
 
 
Graph 6: 5 and 9-year moving averages of world (industrial) growth since 1740 
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Legend: economic growth in the world system since 1740; adapted from Goldstein, 1988 and UN 
ECE/Fischer Weltalmanach, current issues. 5 and 9-year moving averages 
 
 
 
The Kondratieff cycle dating game
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Legend: the darker and thicker line are 9-year moving averages, the lighter and thinner lines are 5-year mov-
ing averages 
 
Kondratieff year long cycles, to be explained by at least 13 different types of theories, are thematically por-
trayed, amongst others, by Scandella (1998), Goldstein (1988), Bornschier and Suter (1992), Bornschier 
(1988, expanded and updated English version 1996) and Arrighi (1995).  
 
At present, the world economy is heading for a longer world economic ascent, that might be interrupted by a 
Kuznets-type downswing in succession of 1958, 1975, 1992. After the economic crisis of 1825, the stock 
exchange collapse of 1873, the Black Friday of 1929 and the world recession starting in 1973/75, world 
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capitalism has experienced quite severe downswing-phases, that hit with elementary weight especially the 
countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery.  
The data series, constructed from Goldstein’s original data, is explained quite markedly by the application of 
the Kondratieff and Kuznets-cycle hypotheses, even when there are no data filtering or smoothening opera-
tions being performed. And add to this the lagged movement of world prices and interest rates, which are 
part and parcel of the cycle structure (Scandella, 1998). Among the main theories, that explain these 
Kondratieff cycles, the following schools stand out (Bornschier and Suter, 1992): 
 
(i)  economic factor theories, that again have to be broken down into the sub-categories of innovation theo-
ries, capital accumulation theories, sector theories, and terms of trade approaches 
(ii) socio-cultural factor theories, that explain the long cycles from the viewpoint of quantitative and historical 
sociology, by the social structure of accumulation, by the modes of regulation (regulatory approaches), by 
technological styles, by employment processes, by social inequality trends, by social movements and con-
flicts, by cycles of order, or by societal structural change 
(iii) hegemonic cycle theories in the quantitative international relations school, that link Kondratieff cycles to 
international instability, war and peace. 
 
For Bornschier’s sociology of the long cycle, there are the following phases 
 
(i) upswing 
(ii) prosperity 
(iii) prosperity-recession 
(iv) crisis 
(v) temporary recovery 
(vi) depression 
 
The final result of our Kondratieff-cycle estimates is the following: 
 
Graph 7: Kondratieff cycles, based on 9 year moving averages 
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Legend: economic growth rates in the world system, as being estimated from Goldstein’s data series 
 
If we let the postwar-cycle end with 1975, the functions have the following shape: 
 
 
Graph 8: The cycle 1932 - 1975/1982 
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Legend: data about the severity of the depression in 1975 differ according to the data source used. 
 
The following dating scheme could be suggested in the light of the Schumpeterian theory tradition and also in 
the light of new evidence, put forward about world inflation (Scandella, 1998; Bornschier, 1988 and 1996; 
Laughland, 1998). Laughland’s time series about world inflation is especially relevant here, since it attempts 
to cover the industrialized world. It records the world depressions, as in our approach, during the 1740s and 
1740s, the 1830s and 1840s, the 1880s and the 1930s. For us, 1756, 1832, 1885, 1932 and 1975-82 are 
the beginnings of new Kondratieff cycles, while 1756, 1774, 1793, 1812, 1832, 1862, 1885, 1908, 1932, 
1958, 1975, and 1992 are the turning points of Kuznets cycles. This dating scheme contradicts in one major 
respect the dating attempts by Ernest Mandel and Joshua Goldstein, whose second 19th Century depression 
ends by around 1895, and not 1885 or 1875. However, by dating the late 19th Century depression too late, 
the cycle from the late 19th Century to the Great Depression of the 1930s becomes too short in duration: 
 
 
Graph 9: the dating game of the Kondratieff cycle in the second half of the 19th Century ...  
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The Kondratieff dating game, late 19th Century
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Graph 10: The Kondratieff cycles 1850 - 1930 
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The late 19th Century, most probably like the early 21st Century, as a period of intensive globalization, is 
characterized by very strong shorter-term fluctuations. 
 
It is important to remember that the B-phases in the Kondratieff cycles present a downswing in yearly 
growth rates, that can be traced even by using the original data, and not just by moving averages. However, 
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the B-phase tendency became more pronounced over time, while in earlier periods, the Kuznets- and Juglar 
cycle fluctuations overlapped strongly with Kondratieffs: 
 
Graph 11: the downswing phases 
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The Kondratieff B-phase 1865-1885
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The Kondratieff B-phase 1915-1932
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The Kondratieff B-phase 1968-1982
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The stylized Kondratieff-functions that express a tendency, rather than a cycle in the world economy, could 
have the following form: 
 
Graph 12: the stylized Kondratieff cycles since 1740 
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Source: our own compilations, using a cosine function (1740 = 0; 1741 = 0,85; 1742 = 0,85 + 0,85 etc.). 
Economic growth in the world system since 1740; adapted from Goldstein, 1988 and UN ECE/Fischer 
Weltalmanach, current issues. 5 and 9-year moving averages and the trend lines for these two data series 
 
In his overview of Kondratieff cycle theories, Luigi Scandella re-interprets parts of economic theory, like the 
Phillips curve and the Fisher equation, in the light of the long-cycle literature and arrives at the conclusion, 
that price levels and interest rates fluctuate as well in the above described way, with a time-lag of 5 to 10 
years between production and price levels and between price levels and interest rates. Thus the way is open 
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for important further empirical research, since historic price level data are far more complete than historic 
production data. 
 
Contemporary world system research did not spell out as clearly as would have been necessary the interre-
lationship between the Kondratieff cycles and the Kuznets cycles. Kuznets cycles are especially relevant for 
our understanding of the ups and downs of world economics and politics: our data series, constructed from 
Goldstein’s original data, is explained quite markedly by the application of Kuznets-cycle hypotheses, even 
when there are now data filtering or smoothening operations being performed: 
 
 
Graph 13: Kuznets-cycles in the world system, 1756 - 1997 
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1975 - 1992 (estimate 1) 
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Legend: EXCEL multiple regressions, based on ‘insert trend lines’; the data are the original, un-transformed 
growth rates of capitalist world production, according to Goldstein, 1988, as calculated in Chapter 3. The 
data series about industrial country GDP growth 1975 - 1997 is from UN ECE (Economic Survey of 
Europe), IFRI and IMF sources (World Economic Outlook). In the last graph about growth in the period 
1975 - 1998, we also show 2-year sliding averages. The difference between the two data series lies in the 
assumption about economic growth in the 1990s. (1) is based on IFRI; (2) is based on IMF 
 
 
The shortening sequence of crises in the world economy 
 
 
The summary conclusion from the above presented evidence is the hypothesis about the shortening of the 
cycles: 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: signal crises and terminal crises occur at a shortening rhythm 
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As it is well-known in world system research, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual 
Kondratieff depressions), and there are terminal crises of the world system, like the great crash of the early 
1340s, which marked the beginning of the Genoese age (Arrighi) or Portuguese and Genoese age (Model-
ski), the crash of the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the depression of the 1750s and 
1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the Great depression 1930s, which was the termi-
nal crisis of British world capitalist dominance (Arrighi, 1995). Regulation can be successful, like after 
1560, and 1930, and deregulation can be successful, like after 1340, 1760, and - most probably - the 
1980s (compiled from Arrighi, 1995). The ‘logistic cycle’ of British hegemony in the capitalist world system 
has the following shape: 
 
 
 
British hegemony in the world system - growth of world ind. 
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American hegemony in world capitalism
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Legend: our own compilations from Goldstein, 1988 
 
A world hegemony thus evolves and declines during two Kondratieff cycles. We think it fairly safe to as-
sume, that there is no such early forthcoming terminal crisis of the capitalist system, but that the risk for such 
a crisis rapidly increases after 2020 or 2030. Even at the risk of gross oversimplification, the following 
scheme could be drawn: 
 
 
Scheme 1: terminal crises of capitalism 
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Source: our own compilation from Arrighi, 1995, and Tausch, 1998. The above graph can be interpreted 
only as a very rough simplification.  
 
This leaves us with the not so comfortable thought, that the next terminal crisis will affect the world by 2080 
at the latest. But, as a genuinely new hypothesis in the literature, we start from the well-funded assumption 
that one of the most alarming features of today’s globalized casino capitalism is that cycles tend to become 
shorter again. It is entirely conceivable that Kuznets cycles will last in future 15 years or less, and Kondratieff 
cycles 30 years or less. This will mean a growth of instability in the world capitalist system, with an ever 
shorter sequence of ups and downs, ins and outs, past and future ‘models’ and growth and decay regions 
and sectors, that will change like fashions. The savings and labor of entire generations will be thrown over-
board in a few days of speculative storms. The evolutionary length of cycles is the following: 
 
Table 4: the length of Kuznets and Kondratieff cycles in the history of world capitalism 
 
 
 Kuznets cy-
cles 
Kondratieff 
cycles 
 
1756 18 76 
1774 19  
1793 19  
1812 20  
1832 30 53 
1862 23  
1885 23 47 
1908 24  
1932 26 43 
1958 17  
1975 17  
1992   
 
 
The following scheme now shows the continuation of what we interpret to be Arrighi’s thought, above: 
 
 
Scheme 2: Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles - their length since 1740 
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The shortening of capitalist cycles
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Legend: Kuznets and Kondratieff cycle length in years 
 
Scheme 3: the length of Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles and growth rates since 1740. Cycle length in world 
capitalism 
 
Cycles 1741-2010Kuznets cycle length = -0,0007x2 + 0,174x + 13,955
R2 = 0,546
Kondratieff cycle length = 0,001x2 - 0,3991x + 81,899
R2 = 0,996
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Legend: yearly economic growth rate in %, left-hand scale. Length of the Kuznets cycle in years (left hand 
scale). Length of the Kondratieff cycle in years (right hand scale). Our own re-interpretation of the length of 
Kuznets and Kondratieff cycles in world capitalism, based on Goldstein’s data on world growth, 1988. 
 
 
The effects of Tsunami waves in history 
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Tsunami waves have devastating effects on the world societal system. Since we do not have, say, time-series 
estimates about infant mortality, life expectancy, wages and income distribution over time in countries of the 
world system since 1300 or 1400 we have to present crude guesses about the social effects of earlier Tsu-
nami waves in history. We now try to present such very preliminary findings from the secondary analysis of 
published literature. The terminal crises of 1340, 1560, 1750, and 1930 happened before or during the 100 
years Italian War, the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War as the culmina-
tion of the German Wars of the last Century. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5: terminal crises of capitalism are Tsunami waves, and they have a devastating effect 
on the world social system 
 
 
The Tsunami-like effects of terminal crises of capitalism can be assessed for earlier periods only indirectly. 
We stipulate here, that the devastating consequences of the crises of 1340 and 1750 manifest themselves, 
among others, in data about the shrinking share of Europe’s population in world population. Such a data 
series was provided recently by Andre Gunder Frank (1998). The astonishing results, that support our hy-
pothesis, are printed below: 
 
Graph 14: the devastating effects of Tsunamis in history 
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Tsunami/terminal crises always led to global wars in the capitalist world system, and the time distance be-
tween the onset of Arrighi depressions and major global wars becomes shorter, leading one to suspect that 
this indeed is a structural feature of the system: 
 
 
Graph 15: Tsunamis and global wars 
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The Tsunami waves of world politics
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Time distance between beginnings of major wars
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Legend: our own compilation from Arrighi, 1994, Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 1999 and Goldstein, 1988 
 
The prediction of a Kuznets crisis in the early part of the present decade and major power conflict after 
2030 is one thing. The hegemonial power debate, Vaerynen is correct on this point, is top-heavy and over-
looks the effects of long cycles on smaller nations and on the world periphery and semi-periphery. 218 re-
pressive regimes (141 state regimes and 77 quasi-state and group regimes) killed from 1900 to 1987 nearly 
170 million of their own citizens and foreigners - about four times the number of people killed in domestic 
and international wars during that same period. Most of these deaths occurred during the ‘earthquake’ of the 
Tsunami wave of world politics and economics that hit the globe from 1914 to 1945. The aftermath of these 
upheavals on the Eurasian landmass were terrible indeed. These murderous regimes were one of the main 
consequences of the terminal crisis of capitalism in the first half of the 20th Century. More than  50% of the 
estimated violent political deaths in human history happened during the terminal crisis of the early 20th Cen-
tury and its aftermath: 
 
The statistical tables, contained in Rummel’s website (http://www.freedomnest.com) about the millions of 
victims of democide, war and repression in history are: 
 
 
Table 5: the terminal crises of capitalism mean massive democide, war and repression 
 
 
Soviet Union 61,9 
All Wars,30BC-19AD 40,5 
Wars of the 20th Century 38 
Communist China 35,2 
Old China (-1900) 33,5 
Mongols 1300 - 1400 29,9 
Chinese Leap Forward 27 
Nazi Germany 20,9 
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African Slavery 17,3 
American Indians 13,8 
Nationalist China 10,1 
Japan (1936-45) 5,9 
Old India (-1800) 4,5 
Chinese guerrilla (1923-49) 3,5 
other 20th Century murderers 2,8 
Old Iran (-19th Century) 2 
Ottoman Emp. (-19th Century) 2 
Pol Pot 2 
Turkey 1909-18 1,9 
Communism in Vietnam 1945-87 1,7 
North Korea 1,7 
Poland (1945-48) 1,6 
Old Japan (-19th Century) 1,5 
Pakistan (1958-87) 1,5 
Mexico (1900-20) 1,4 
Tito (1944-87) 1,1 
Old Russia (-19th Century) 1 
Crusades 1095-1272 1 
Zarist Russia 1900-17 1 
Aztecs 1 
Atatürk 1919-23 0,9 
Chinese Warlords (1917-49) 0,9 
UK 1900-87 0,8 
Portugal 1926-82 0,7 
Indonesia 1965-87 0,7 
Spanish Inquisition 1500-1700 0,35 
French Revolution 0,26 
Albigensian Crusade (1208-1249) 0,2 
Witch Hunts (1400-1600) 0,1 
Grand Total (regimes, wars and repres-
sions 1-39) 
372,11 
terminal crisis 1900-1950 related victims  187,7 
terminal crisis victims in % of total 
victims  
50,4 
 
 
Legend: democide, war and repression, that coincided with or were the effect of a Tsunami wave (terminal 
crisis) 1900-1950, are printed in bold letters 
 
Who will be the groups that most violently are going to challenge the logic of accumulation on a global scale? 
Does capitalist globalization, that process of unequal and uneven development, in the end cause the cultural 
conflicts in the world system, as globalization theories would maintain (Axtmann, 1995)? Among the most 
murderous regimes of the 20th Century, which killed 169.2 million people from 1900 to 1987, only 2 be-
longed to the capitalist center - the UK as a retreating colonial power, and Germany, which might be 
termed as a partial semi-periphery, and not a proper center at the time of the onset of National Socialism 
(Pomerania, Eastern Prussia), while 37 others were countries of the periphery and the semi-
periphery. Peace and survival on earth will be determined to a great degree, whether or not de-
mocratic and not authoritarian ‘reform’ models will take hold and whether or not there will be 
mechanisms to contain the devastating force of future Tsunami waves of world politics and eco-
nomics. 
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Hegemonial Challenge and Technological dependence 
 
 
The most important reason, why the North America-Pacific triangle gained ground in the world market was 
the pattern of specialization based on co-operation with less-developed partners that significantly cut pro-
duction costs (Inotai, 1993).  
 
29 countries with a Pacific coast now already control over 53% of the world GNP, and the Pacific rim-lands 
tended to be the countries with the highest growth-rates in the world economy. This 'earthquake' has set free 
powerful forces of change on the European landmass, both East and west of the Iron Curtain, while the 
power of the world depression during the 1980s and beyond brought new centers of gravity of the world 
economy to the fore. At the same time and by the very same process, the new international division of labor 
restructured the old industrial centers and created new conflicts. The share of the industrial labor force in 
total employment in East Asia (excluding China) is now 34% and is thus higher than in the established indus-
trial countries. 
 
The moment of victory over communism in Europe became, the moment of the fundamental weakness of 
both Europe and North America in a changing world economy. But at the same time, there was a dra-
matic southward shift of European productive potential, that could be threatened by a stronger ‘Euro’, that 
could ruin the European mezzogiorno’s export capacity that grew over the last years. The following materi-
als, calculated from Le Monde, Bilan du Monde 2000 show very clearly how the current account balance 
of Germany becomes positive, while the Southern European surplus dwindles: 
 
 
Table 6: the current account balance of the European Union with and without Germany 
 
 
 current account EU current account Germany implicit current account 
non-German EU 
 
1996 83,7 -13,8 97,5 
1997 118,5 -4 122,5 
1998 83,1 -4,2 87,3 
1999 27,5 -1,1 28,6 
2000 22,8 2,6 20,2 
 
Legend: our own calculations from Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000 
 
 
In trying to predict the future challenges in world politics, one is left with an amazing variety of propositions, 
utterly contradicting one another. We agree with Giovanni Arrighi’s and Beverly Silver’s recent contention 
that: 
 
‘Abu-Lughod does not say what these rules (i.e. the relative balance of multiple centers to which the 
world system will return) (...) might be and who would make and enforce them. Shortly after she fin-
ished her book (i.e. Abu Lughod, 1989), the Berlin wall came tumbling down, leading to contradictory 
claims that the new rules would be made in Washington, or in Brussels, or in Tokyo, or in the secrecy 
of corporate board rooms, silent electronic networks, and noisy market places, until Huntington (i.e. 
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1993) came along summoning the circling of the Western wagons lest the Rest under Chinese leader-
ship do to the West what the West has been doing to the Rest. While we wait for the dust to settle, 
Abu-Lughod’s suggestion that the future may bear some resemblance to a premodern past is as 
good as anybody else’s guess’ (Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 20) 
 
There is indeed a startling variety of predictions about future conflict and cooperation in the world system, 
even among world-systems researchers. Chase Dunn (1996) and Chase-Dunn/Podobnik fear future core 
war, with the United States as the declining hegemon and a united Europe as the possible future challenger.  
Weede (1999) scathingly dismisses the possibility of such a European threat by drawing attention to the ba-
sic weakness of the contemporary European political economy. Boswell (1999) and Boswell and Chase - 
Dunn (2000) see a chance, that Europe - rather like the Dutch hegemony in the world system before - be-
comes a force of global change and a future hegemon - without a future world war. As Weede certainly cor-
rectly predicts, peace in the Pacific depends on free trade for China - and that the US indeed will guarantee. 
By contrast, very sharp and bitter confrontations might arise between America and Europe over access to 
the Caspian Sea and its bn 150 barrels oil reserves, and over foreign policy vis-à-vis the Balkans, Turkey 
and the Middle East, with Europe favoring a rapprochement with Serbia after its October 2000 transition, 
with the Palestinians and the Kurds, while America favoring the Washington/Ankara/Jerusalem axis. A Euro-
pean led transition to global governance and democracy might be based, Boswell and Chase - Dunn argue, 
on the high social standards, prevalent in the European Union as a possible future catalyst for other regions 
of the world to follow. In a similar vein, Bornschier (1999) argues that the European Single Market has the 
potential for a positive transformation of the world system. Our argument is more down-to-earth, and in line 
with such divergent authors as Modelski, 1999 and Bergesen and Fernandez, 1999, trying to analyze em-
pirically the upcoming contradictions, that the European political economy faces in the world system. In ear-
lier publications, the present author rather tended towards predictions, modeled around the arguments pro-
posed by Kennedy, Huntington, Weede and also Goldstein, thus excluding a rivalry between Europe and the 
American/Pacific economic compound. China would be the main challenging protagonist, with Russia and 
radical Islamic states as their main allies. We agree with Modelski (1999), that global challengers were al-
ways characterized by the interaction of  
 
a large army 
a large economy 
a closed, controlled society 
and weak, ethnocentric media. 
 
Russett’s hypothesis about the great probability of peace between democracies is an all-important, further 
element in this debate. What is more probable, then? Democratization of China, a free trade regime for 
China, or a re-authoritarianization of the European continent? At any rate, the future of the open society in 
Europe, the exact fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria of a functioning democracy and market economy in 
the EU enlargement process, and the future democratization of the Union - also in face of the darker sides of 
the European heritage and the very idea of an economically united Europe under authoritarian premises 
(Laughland, 1998) - become decisive whether or not Europe will become a global challenger in Modelski’s 
sense, and will become a challenger of the new evolving global leadership along the Pacific axis, that could fit 
into the pattern, described by Modelski: 
 
an oceanic navy 
lead industries, fiscal strength 
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democratic potential, party system 
strong active media. 
 
An intriguing subject for further world systems studies is the comparative analysis of the economic and world 
political mechanisms that were used by Venice, the Hapsburg Empire, France, and Germany during their 
hegemonial attempts. One proposition, that indeed emerges from Modelski’s research and our own reading 
of the world systems literature, which could be of immediate relevance for the analysis for the future condi-
tions, which Europe faces in the world economy, is the territorial concept of power (Arrighi calls it, in refer-
ence to Venice, ‘terraferma’) on the part of challenging nations. Furthermore, a relatively closed society, 
not open to outside migration, especially from ethnic minorities, combined with high customs, a reliance on 
military land power, exploitative relations with the internal and immediate external peripheries (the hinterland 
of Northern Italy, the Spanish colonies and internal peripheries in Hapsburg Europe, the French internal pe-
ripheries and colonies, and Germany’s ‘Drang nach Osten’) and a relatively weak technological home-base 
characterize the attempts at world power, while the successful future world hegemons (the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were the practical opposites on all or most 
of these dimensions: a naval, knowledge-driven and world-market concept of power, a society open to mi-
gration, low customs, a large sea power and a smaller, but mobile and disciplined and readily deployable 
land-army, and a strong technological home-base. Significant for hegemonic success is also the strong social 
role of the urban merchant class, that is in stark contrast to the ties between the land and capitalism, charac-
teristic of the ‘rentier’ political economy of Venice, Hapsburg Europe, France, and Germany. We thus dare 
to venture the following additional hypothesis: the hegemonial challengers act out of a position of technologi-
cal dependence and relative backwardness. We thus formulate: 
 
 
Hypothesis 6: Europe could be driven into a position of a technologically dependent challenger 
 
 
Full transition to democracy in the East and the maintenance of democracy in Western Europe would be one 
precondition, that an enlarged Europe remains a peaceful continent. For that reason alone, the Copenhagen 
criteria on stable democracy are so important for the enlargement process. A slipping back into authoritarian 
patterns in the EU-15 is also, at least theoretically, not excluded. Germany plays an especially crucial role 
here, because of its size, and its history in the first half of the 20th Century, and because of the recent transi-
tion to democracy in the Eastern part of the country after 1989 (Persky, 1999; Papayoanou, 1996). The 
specter of a re-transition in other member states has been debated recently. Austria and Italy are usually 
mentioned in this context, but the list of candidates is long. Suffice to mention here the shocking success of 
the Flemish bloc in Belgium. The lack of more direct democracy at the level of the Union itself did not es-
cape the attention of neo-liberal critics and euro-sceptics, especially in Britain (for a provocative summary of 
this kind of interpretation, Laughland, 1998; Botsford, 1997). A more authoritarian trajectory on the Euro-
pean continent would further the rift between the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden on the one hand 
and the rest of the EU on the other hand. The UK, Sweden and Denmark already do not belong to the Euro 
zone and would drift further into the northern European United States zone of influence (Norway, Iceland, 
UK, Sweden and Denmark then forming, together with English-speaking Canada, a real North-Atlantic zone 
of influence). It corresponds to the wisdom of neo-liberal economics, that the European Union is modeled 
around protectionism: both revenues as well as expenditures are based largely on the protective element, and 
there is little room for innovation: 
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Graph 16: the reasons for Europe’s growing technological backwardness - EU revenues and expenditures 
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Legend: our own compilation from Fischer Weltalmanach, 1999, based on the EU budget 1998. 
 
Research by the Zurich school of sociology already showed that technological dependence had a negative 
effect on long-run economic growth and income redistribution (Bornschier et al. 1980; Bornschier and 
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Heintz, 1978). A new data series, presented by the World Bank WDR 1999 , together with the earlier data, 
presented by the Zurich school, allow for a comparison of the evolution of technological dependence on a 
global scale.  
 
Today, the European Union (15) controls 25% of the world resident patent applications, the United States 
16%, while Japan and its regional orbits South Korea and the Philippines control not fewer than 57% of 
world resident patent applications: 
 
 
Graph 17: the reasons for Europe’s growing technological backwardness: shares in total world resident pat-
ent applications 
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Legend: Shares in total world resident patent applications, as calculated from WDR, World Bank, 1999. 
Japan Coprosperity is comprising Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. 
 
 
Graph 18 shows, how Europe - in contrast to the USA and Japan - is facing globalization from a passive 
perspective - as a prolonged workbench of the TNCs, which invest in Europe in pretty much the same way 
as the TNCs did in Latin America during the time of import substitution - to be present in a market, shielded 
by an average level of 7% external customs for industrial products: 
 
 
Graph 18: The share of the US, the EU and Japan in world resident and non-resident patents by international 
comparison: 
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Legend: our own calculations from World Bank, WDR, 1999. 
 
 
Table 7 shows that Japan is by far the technologically most dominant country in the world, with over 
340.000 resident patent applications per year, while in the US this figure is over 110.000. South Korea 
leads Germany by over 68.000 applications compared to Germany’s 56.757. With hardly a quarter of 
world resident patent applications, the European Union is in no position to effectively be a technologically 
leading center of the world economy in the 21st Century: 
 
Table 7: technological dependence in the world system 
 
 
 resident patent 
applications 
nonresident patent 
applications 
patent penetration 
(=2*100/(1+2)) 
(unweighted coeffi-
cient) 
 
% of world resident 
patents 
% of world non-
resident patents 
Japan 340861 60390 15,05 47,4 2,64 
United States 111883 111536 49,92 15,56 4,88 
Korea Republic 68446 45548 39,96 9,52 1,99 
Germany 56757 98338 63,41 7,89 4,3 
UK 25269 104084 80,47 3,51 4,56 
Russian Federation 18138 28149 60,81 2,52 1,23 
France 17090 81418 82,65 2,38 3,56 
China 11698 41016 77,81 1,63 1,8 
Australia 9196 34125 78,77 1,28 1,49 
Italy 8860 71992 89,04 1,23 3,15 
Netherlands 4884 61958 92,69 0,68 2,71 
Ukraine 3640 22862 86,27 0,51 1 
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Canada 3316 45938 93,27 0,46 2,01 
Finland 3262 61556 94,97 0,45 2,69 
Switzerland 2699 75576 96,55 0,38 3,31 
Spain 2689 81294 96,8 0,37 3,56 
Brazil 2655 29451 91,73 0,37 1,29 
Austria 2506 75985 96,81 0,35 3,33 
Denmark 2452 72151 96,71 0,34 3,16 
Poland 2414 24902 91,16 0,34 1,09 
Romania 1831 22139 92,36 0,25 0,97 
India 1660 6632 79,98 0,23 0,29 
Norway 1550 25628 94,3 0,22 1,12 
New Zealand 1421 26947 94,99 0,2 1,18 
Israel 1363 12172 89,93 0,19 0,53 
Belgium 1356 59099 97,76 0,19 2,59 
Kazakhstan 1024 20064 95,14 0,14 0,88 
Ireland 925 52407 98,27 0,13 2,29 
Uzbekistan 914 21088 95,85 0,13 0,92 
Hungary 832 24147 96,67 0,12 1,06 
Belarus 701 20347 96,67 0,1 0,89 
Czech R 623 24856 97,55 0,09 1,09 
Egypt 504 706 58,35 0,07 0,03 
Greece 434 52371 99,18 0,06 2,29 
Mexico 389 30305 98,73 0,05 1,33 
Turkey 367 19668 98,17 0,05 0,86 
Bulgaria 318 22235 98,59 0,04 0,97 
Slovenia 301 21868 98,64 0,04 0,96 
 
 
Table 8 shows the dramatic decline of the European technological position over time. The European Union 
(15) and the EU accession countries were among the countries with the highest growth rates of technological 
dependence, while the Pacific/Indian Ocean area nations Canada, South Korea, India, Australia and Japan 
had very slow or even negative growth rates of technological dependence. They, and not the present or ex-
tended European Union, are the future dynamic pole of the world economy. Although the United States also 
lost its former strong position (patent penetration increased from 27% to nearly 50% over the last 20 years), 
the European (EU 15) position is now alarmingly weak. Germany is today’s most technologically independ-
ent nation in the Union, with a patent penetration coefficient of 63.41%, followed by the UK (80.47%) and 
France (82.65%). Germany’s resident patent applications (56.757) were lower than those in South Korea 
(68.446). Within 20 years, Germany lost more than 16% of its technological sovereignty: 
 
 
Table 8: the increases/decreases of technological dependence over time 
 
 
   patent penetration end 
1990s 
 
patent penetration 
1965-1975 
rate of change 1975-
end 1990s 
Romania   92,36   10,5 81,86 
Czech Republic   97,55   23,44 74,11 
Poland   91,16   24,58 66,58 
Russian Federation  60,81   3,81 57 
Greece   99,18   42,49 56,69 
Hungary   96,67   56,84 39,83 
Bulgaria   98,59   60,37 38,22 
 43
Switzerland   96,55   72,59 23,96 
Spain   96,8   73,94 22,86 
United States  49,92   27,38 22,54 
Finland   94,97   73,37 21,6 
France   82,65   66,01 16,64 
Germany   63,41   47,05 16,36 
Austria   96,81   84,17 12,64 
Brazil   91,73   80,35 11,38 
New Zealand   94,99   85,6 9,39 
Italy   89,04   79,81 9,23 
Denmark   96,71   89,22 7,49 
Netherlands    92,69   86,11 6,58 
Belgium   97,76   91,33 6,43 
Turkey   98,17   91,96 6,21 
Mexico   98,73   92,74 5,99 
Norway   94,3   89,04 5,26 
UK   80,47   76,18 4,29 
Israel   89,93   86,63 3,3 
Ireland   98,27   97,78 0,49 
Korea Republic  39,96   39,75 0,21 
Canada   93,27   94,78 -1,51 
India   79,98   85,07 -5,09 
Australia   78,77   89,11 -10,34 
Japan   15,05   28,46 -13,41 
Egypt   58,35   95,99 -37,64 
Belarus   96,67     
China   77,81     
Kazakhstan   95,14     
Slovenia   98,64     
Ukraine   86,27     
Uzbekistan   95,85     
 
Legend: countries printed in bold letters are members of the European Union; countries printed in bold and 
indented letters are candidates for European Union membership 
 
 
Graph 19 now shows, that this assessment about an erosion of the European long-term power base in the 
world economy also applies to the European share in the world-wide stock of foreign direct investments and 
in the share of the top 50 companies of the world economy. Europe was on the rise until 1990, but has de-
clined since then: 
 
 
Graph 19a: Europe’s share in the world-stock of foreign direct investments in % since 1914 
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Graph 19b: Europe’s share in the top 50 corporations in the world economy by international comparison 
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Legend: EU Europe excludes the Swiss transnational corporations, because Switzerland is not a member of 
the European Union 
 
Graph 19c: The march towards world hegemony of the Japanese transnational corporation: 1960 - 2000 
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Legend: our own calculations from Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1999; and Bergesen and Fernandez, 1999, 
as well as the Fortune top 50 company list at: http://www.fortune.com/fortune/global500/. The Berge-
sen/Fernandez data series had to be recalculated because of the inclusion of Switzerland in the European 
total in their original table 8.2. We thus had to subtract the Swiss corporations (non-EU-member; table 8.1 
of their original work) from the European figures in table 8.2 to arrive at the EU total. As to the world top 50 
companies, see appendix.  
 
Without the British and Anglo-Dutch TNCs, the European performance would be weaker still. It should be 
added, that technological dependence is one important reason for unemployment, social stagnation, a lacking 
human capital formation and poverty: 
 
 
Graph 20: technological dependence and unemployment 
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Legend: industrialized western democracies without transformation country OECD members; data are from 
UNDP HDR 1999 and World Bank WDR 1999; our own compilations from the original tables 
 
 
Table 9 now shows the most important correlations of technological dependence with social decay on the 
level of the industrialized and transformation countries: 
 
 
Table 9: the correlates of technological dependence 
 
 
unemployment benefits per Gov expenditures 0,42 
female long-term unemployment 0,37 
agriculture as % of GDP 0,29 
youth unemployment 0,26 
infant mortality 0,26 
female unemployment 0,24 
male long-term unemployment 0,24 
under five mortality rate 0,24 
male unemployment 0,23 
population below $14.40 a day 0,22 
people not expected to survive age 60 0,18 
private consumption as % of GDP 0,18 
CO2 emissions per US $ of GDP 0,11 
inflation rate 0,11 
maternal mortality 0,1 
budget surplus per GDP -0,1 
real earnings per employee growth rate 1980-92 -0,11 
gross domestic savings -0,2 
labour force participation ratio -0,21 
gross domestic investment -0,23 
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services as % of GDP -0,3 
female net secondary school enrollment ratio -0,33 
real GDP poorest 20% -0,39 
terms of trade (1987 = 100) -0,46 
population served by public sanitation -0,56 
economic size (GDP in $) -0,61 
R&D scientists and technicians per 1000 people -0,61 
public health expenditure (per total pub expenditure) -0,86 
 
Legend: our own calculations from UNDP Human Development Report electronic data file 
 
 
The close link between technological dependence, social stagnation and the further deterioration of the ex-
ternal terms of trade prepare the ground for a downward spiral, from which it will be most difficult to escape. 
 
 
The myth of European future hegemony 
 
 
An enlarged Europe is even more under a motive to reflect on the kind of its political elites. High subven-
tions, a large state sector, a weak democracy on a Union level, close links between the agro-multis and the 
urban business elites, and a pervasive and growing influence of transnational criminal corporations of the 
mafia, n’drangheta etc. type in major European countries and their systematic and fraudulent misuse of EU 
subventions would be a 21st Century type of terra-ferma constellation that could bloc Europe’s path to-
wards the ‘Modelski’ constellation of global leadership: 
 
an oceanic navy 
lead industries, fiscal strength 
democratic potential, party system 
strong active media 
 
Corruption is a perpetual redistribution mechanism away from economic growth, and from the poor and in 
favor of the rich. In the OECD, the shadow economy is already 14.2% of GDP; in the transition countries 
23.2% and in the developing world, 39.2% (Schneider and Enste, 1998; for a case study about organized 
crime, see Viviano, 1995). Full EU enlargement (the two Mediterranean island economies of Cyprus and 
Malta plus the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Turkey) will mean a considerable increase in the level of existing average corruption, and the 
average share of the shadow economy for the European Union (the averages for the present EU 15 
compared to the averages of the hypothetical new EU 15 + 13), as well as the average homicide rate, if 
enlargement were to take place tomorrow, and if there is no dramatic change in the present trends. The fol-
lowing summary table shows this: 
 
 
Table 10: corruption, the shadow economy and crime in an enlarged EU 
 
 freedom from corruption index shadow economy as % of 
GNP 
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population unweighted average for 
fully enlarged EU (15 + 13) 
6,1 16,4 
USA 7,5 13,9 
population unweighted average for the 
present EU 15 
7,7 13,4 
Canada 9,2 10,0 
Japan 6,0 8,5 
Switzerland 8,9 6,9 
Norway 8,9 5,9 
New Zealand 9,4  
Iceland 9,2  
Australia 8,7  
Israel 6,8  
 
 
 corruption perception 
index 
shadow economy 
as % of GNP 
 
homicide rate per 
100.000 inhabi-
tants  
 
Bulgaria 3,3 36,1 10,5 
Romania 3,3 19,1  
Latvia 3,4 35,3 14,7 
Turkey 3,6   
Slovakia 3,7 5,8 2,4 
Lithuania 3,8 21,6 14,2 
Poland 4,2 12,6 3,1 
Czech Republic 4,6 11,3 2,1 
Italy 4,7 20,4 4,7 
Greece 4,9 27,2 2,5 
Hungary 5,2 29 4,3 
Belgium 5,3 15,3 3,1 
Estonia 5,7 11,8 24,4 
Japan 6 8,5 1 
Slovenia 6  4,9 
fully enlarged EU (see above) 6,2 16,4 6,3 
Spain 6,6 16,1 1,6 
France 6,6 10,4 4,7 
Portugal 6,7 15,6 4,1 
Israel 6,8  6,2 
USA 7,5 13,9  
Austria 7,6  2,4 
Ireland 7,7 7,8 0,7 
EU 15 (see above) 7,7 13,4 5,1 
Germany 8 10,5  
UK 8,6 7,2  
Australia 8,7  3,6 
Luxembourg 8,8  7,6 
Norway 8,9 5,9 2,1 
Switzerland 8,9 6,9 2,3 
Netherlands 9 11,8 14,8 
Canada 9,2 10 1,9 
Iceland 9,2   
Sweden 9,4 10,6 9,5 
New Zealand 9,4   
Finland 9,8  10,1 
Denmark 10 9,4 4,9 
Cyprus   1,5 
Malta   2,4 
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Legend: our own compilation from Transparency International (column 1) Schneider/Enste, based on John-
son (column 2) and UNDP HDR (column 3). 
 
 
The message of this Chapter is thus simple: the European Union has very powerful internal distribution coali-
tions at work, that threaten to make its whole policy-set up non-competitive in the world economy (see, 
amongst others, Nollert, 1997; Nollert and Fiedler, 1996; as to the argument about European law and de-
mocracy, see Thun-Hohenstein and Cede, 1996; also, Voggenhuber, 1995). Clearly, if the Union were to 
be an instrument of world economic ascent and growth, then the countries most integrated into the system 
should be the real tigers of the world. The very geographical center of the Union, Belgium (then a haven of 
growth, and freedom from scandals and corruption), with the Union capital Brussels, would have to be on an 
equal growth footing with Hong Kong before 1997, and the founding member nations, like Germany, France 
and Italy should have unemployment rates well below the outsiders, like Switzerland, Iceland, Malta, Estonia 
or Norway.  
 
But looking at the figures of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s for the European Union and the OECD 
countries, one has to arrive at the depressing conclusion that unemployment in the OECD region now stands 
at 6.4%, while in the EU it reaches 8.8% (Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000).  
 
As a comparison of key social indicators for Belgium (the EU country with the highest Human Development 
Index) with Canada, Norway, USA, Japan, Australia, Iceland and Switzerland, the OECD competitors and 
non-EU-members with a similar high level of development of productive forces shows, there is an under-
achievement of the EU human development leader in terms of life expectancy (lowest among the 8 
compared countries), reduction of functional illiteracy (18.4%, second highest after Switzerland), public 
expenditure for education (3.2%, lowest among the 8 compared countries) and unemployment reduc-
tion (9%, second highest unemployment after Canada) (UNDP, HDR 1999, our own compilations from the 
original sources). But Belgium was the leader - among the compared nations - in terms of corruption 
(Transparency International: http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/). Belgium scored rank 29 in the world scale, 
Greece 36 and Italy 38 among 99 ranks of freedom from corruption. 
 
Authors as divergent as Andre Gunder Frank, Giovanni Arrighi and Erich Weede would predict further 
European relative decline in the global economy. This harsh critique by the growing number of eurosceptics 
among professional social scientists now precisely is, that the Union, as it is structured, is not the answer to 
the problems, but the very reason for them. The neo-liberal German social scientist Erich Weede put it like 
this: 
 
Essential to all scenarios of renewed European greatness is European unity, i.e., a unity that over-
comes bickering about agricultural subsidies, and who pays for them, and replaces it by a unity of 
political purpose and a unified, but purely European (rather than NATO) military structure. It is quite 
certain that this transcendence is not going to happen within a decade. It is uncertain whether it will 
ever happen, or whether even a unified Western Europe will be sufficient in the 2020s. Although I am 
very skeptical about European readiness to unite politically and militarily, another reason why I can-
not imagine European hegemony is that a unified Europe is likely to decline even faster than a 
Europe of nation-states. 
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(...) 
In principle, a united Europe on the one hand and limited government, private property rights and 
market exchange at freely established scarcity prices on the other could be compatible with each 
other. Observation of political practice makes one suspicious, however. The common agricultural 
policy is still the most costly endeavor of the European Community or Union. It always has been an 
orgy of interventionism, inefficiency and injustice. By establishing minimum prices, the European 
Union guarantees overproduction. Price supports benefit rich farmers more than poor farmers. 
Simultaneously, high food prices hurt poor consumers more than rich consumers. Moreover, ex-
ports of European farm products at subsidized prices hurt American farmers and thereby burden 
transatlantic relations, and hurt Third World or East European farmers, thereby reducing the 
chances of poor countries catching up with the rich countries. In a nutshell, professional econo-
mists would be hard pressed to invent a policy doing as much harm for as little good as the Euro-
pean common agricultural policy. The more general point is that the Europeanization of economic 
policy-making establishes the opportunity to commit policy errors on a much grander scale than has 
been possible in most of European history. Politicians might exploit such opportunities. European 
agricultural policies are also useful to make another point. Decisions are made to serve special inter-
est groups or distributional coalitions, not to serve anything like national, European, or cosmopolitan 
interests. According to Olson, aging political regimes in general, and aging democracies in particular, 
are likely to become prisoners of interests groups and to pursue ever less efficient economic policies. 
Governments intervene in the market, distort prices, transfer income - and interfere with efficient 
resource allocation. The older an established regime - for example, a democracy - becomes, the more 
it suffers from institutional sclerosis and declining economic growth. Although empirical support for 
this proposition has been quite weak where American states have been compared with each other, 
Olson's proposition received fairly strong and consistent support where industrialized democracies 
have been analyzed. Moreover, economic decline was further reinforced by high government reve-
nues, expenditures, or transfer payments. Some European countries, like Britain and Sweden, suffer 
from being old democracies (and therefore afflicted with strong distributional coalitions) and having 
high government expenditures simultaneously; others suffer from at least one of these ailments. Since 
European nations are still fairly close to the leading edge in technology, there is also little room to 
boost growth rates by capturing the 'advantages of backwardness'. Thus, Europe is likely to be out-
performed by more dynamic regions elsewhere. If you add slowly declining economies and a proven 
record of not being capable of collective action in the security field, then the prospect of European 
hegemony displacing American hegemony looks poor (Weede, 1999) 
 
 
The beginning decade of the 2000’s seems to repeat the experience of the 1990s, and 1970s and early 
1980s, when the term ‘Eurosclerosis’ was originally coined: 
 
 
Table 11: short-term GDP growth 1990-98 
 
 
short-term GDP 
growth 1990-98 
 
 
7,5  IRE 
5,4  ISR 
3,9  N 
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3,6  AUS 
3,2  NZ 
2,9  USA 
2,8  DK 
2,6  NL 
2,3  P 
2,2  UK 
2,2  CND 
2  A 
2  SF 
2  GRE 
1,9  SP 
1,6  GER 
1,6  B 
1,5  F 
1,3  J 
1,2  ITA 
1,2  SWE 
0,5  ICE 
0,4  CH 
0,1  LUX 
 
 
Fat and big government, that has been the political strategy of many European countries over the 
Kondratieff-B-phase of the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s, with a resulting explosion of government 
intervention into the economy: 
 
 
Table 12: big government in Europe 
 
 GOVEX per GDP 1960 GOVEX per GDP 1996 
 
Sweden 31,00 66,10 
Denmark 24,80 60,80 
Finland 26,60 59,40 
Netherlands 33,70 58,10 
Germany 32,40 56,00 
France 34,60 54,70 
Belgium 34,50 54,50 
Austria 35,70 52,70 
Italy 30,10 52,70 
Greece 17,40 49,40 
Luxembourg 30,50 49,30 
Canada 28,60 46,40 
Norway 29,90 46,40 
Portugal 17,00 46,00 
Spain 13,70 45,40 
United Kingdom 32,20 43,70 
New Zealand 27,70 42,30 
Ireland 28,00 37,70 
Australia 21,20 37,50 
Iceland 28,20 37,30 
Japan 17,50 36,90 
Switzerland 17,20 36,90 
United States 28,40 34,60 
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Big unemployment, big government, big taxes, big divisions in the social fabric, big wage increases for those 
with secure jobs, while the others wait out in the cold, big expenditures for little real redistribution (in fact, 
Europe could only prevent that a large percentage of the population falls under the 50% of average income 
poverty threshold-line, but the percentage of poor people under 14.40 $ per capita and day as well as the 
percentage of people who die before reaching age 60% are bigger in EU-Europe than in other western de-
mocracies), big gender discrimination, big social stagnation, marginalization of elderly women, little attraction 
for new generations and for new foreign investment, little emphasis on health expenditures - that’s the way 
how EU-Europe works, the real existing Union: 
 
Table 13: the correlates of years of EU membership on the level of western stable democracies: 
 
 
male long-term unemployment rate 0,71 
female long-term unemployment rate 0,69 
tax revenue per GDP 0,60 
central government expenditures per GDP 0,60 
alcohol consumption per capita and year 0,54 
young adults as % of total prisoners  0,42 
real earnings per employee growth rate 1980-92 0,40 
long-term unemployment as % of total labor force 0,38 
expenditure on labor market programs as % of GDP 0,32 
female unpaid family workers as % of total working population 0,30 
female unemployment rate 0,29 
prisoners per total population 0,29 
% population below 14,40 $ per day 0,28 
annual rate of deforestation 0,26 
total unemployment rate 0,23 
% people expected not to survive age 60 0,23 
maternal mortality rate 0,22 
unemployment benefits expenditures per GOVEX 0,20 
real GDP poorest 20% 0,19 
one person households headed by women aged >65 per total households 0,19 
private consumption as % of GDP 0,18 
trees defoliated, as % of all trees 0,12 
male unemployment rate 0,09 
budget surplus/deficit per GDP -0,17 
real GDP richest 20% -0,19 
net foreign direct investment as % of GNP -0,19 
public expenditure on education as % of GNP -0,20 
female economic activity rate -0,21 
GNP growth 1980-95 -0,21 
tertiary students per total population -0,22 
female tertiary students per 100.000 women -0,25 
weekly hours of work in manufacturing -0,29 
forest and woodland as % of total area -0,29 
female administrators and managers as % of total prof. group -0,30 
internal renewable water resources per capita -0,30 
women in government as % of total gov. jobs -0,31 
female professional and technical workers as % of total prof. group -0,32 
gross domestic investment rate -0,34 
labor force participation rate -0,37 
public expenditure on health as % of total PUBEX -0,43 
annual projected population growth rate 1995-2015 -0,51 
% population below 50% income poverty line -0,52 
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public expenditure on education as % of GOVEX -0,53 
 
 
The following graphs underline the bivariate relationships: 
 
Graph 21: the correlates of years of EU membership 
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EU member years and size of government increase
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EU membership years and long term unemployment
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EU membership and public education
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Legend: our own calculations from UNDP HDR electronic data file, Fischer Weltalmanach, 1999 and 
Gwartney et al., 1998 
 
We move to the very center of the EU debate in its present form - is the Union an engine of capitalist ascent? 
The political project of transformation from communism in Europe is not only endangered by the contradic-
tions, globalization creates in its host countries, it is also threatened by certain negative developments in the 
European 'anchor economy'. Almost all the big issues, like agriculture reform, institutional reform, structural 
funds, let alone a real strengthening of the Third Pillar against transnational crime, more rights for the Euro-
pean Parliament, a real common foreign policy, reform of the institutions of the EU, are blocked, and there 
seems no way out. 
 
In order to provide a valid strategy to its member countries, the Union has to be an association of 
world economic ascent and not a club for joint world economic decline. Very early on, a group of 
European policy planning and development researchers, headed by the late Dudley Seers, challenged head-
on the reigning visions of the development strategy of the Commission in Brussels towards the Third World 
and towards the European periphery (Seers, 1978; de Bandt et al., 1980). This theoretical challenge, still 
worthwhile reading today, was the first real and systematic question mark behind the policies of the 
Commission since 1958. The authors of that critique were a European-wide group of committed students of 
development and committed Europeans at the same time. Its leader, Dudley Seers, as one of the doyen of 
development and distribution theory among the world-wide profession of economists, having influenced the 
course of Keynesian economics over the whole post-war years in Britain, and above all a passionate Scots-
man, took up the issue of the center-periphery relationship that characterizes the South, Northwest and east-
bound relationship of the Union (Seers, 1978).  
 
Several authors, most notably Inotai and Malcolm, developed these arguments from a later, liberal perspec-
tive. With its emphasis on structural protection, Inotai maintains, the Union increases rather than decreases 
the long-term cleavages between the centers and the peripheries inside and outside the boundaries of 
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Europe. Today, it is no secret, that 90% of all EU expenditure, union-wide, must be categorized as subven-
tions. With each expansion to semi-peripheral regions, the protective element increases. Simple, as the diag-
nosis might sound, it strikes at the very heart of the conventional Union wisdom on matters of external eco-
nomic relations. A good part of professional economists the world over, liberal and radical social scientists 
alike, have later taken up this theme. They maintain that the Union, by its market protecting arrangements 
with the outer rim of its orbit of influence leads to a secular negative balance of trade of the periphery regions 
with the Union, and thus prolongs structural underdevelopment (amongst others such divergent authors as 
Hickman, 1994; Inotai, 1993; Kennedy, 1993; Amin, 1994). The arguments of such Union critics cannot be 
dismissed a-priori and out of hand.  
 
Western Europe lost in terms of world market shares in a secular trend vis-à-vis the countries of the Pacific; 
the dynamics of growth in the world economy seem to work to the detriment of the old European centers. 
Asia’s ‘basics’ are healthier than expected, and the tide turns to the detriment of the Europeans, now that 
the initial positive effects of European Monetary Union fade away and transnational capital flows again to the 
Pacific region. This is also the true background to the present weakness of the ‘Euro’. 
 
Table 14: the EU in the capitalist world system. Relative share in % 
 
EU share in top world collective service companies 74,60 
EU share in world development aid 56,40 
EU share in top world intermediary good companies 55,30 
EU share in top world insurance companies 55,00 
EU share in top world energy companies 50,20 
EU share in OECD total unemployment 47,70 
EU share in top world banking companies 45,90 
EU share in top world automobile industry 41,60 
EU share in top world chemical and pharma companies 40,00 
EU share in top world electrical equipment companies 38,30 
EU share in top world distribution companies 38,10 
EU share in OECD total GDP 36,50 
EU share in top world food industries 34,30 
EU share in OECD population 34,30 
EU share in top world telecom companies 33,70 
EU share in OECD defense expenditure 33,50 
EU share in top world electronical companies 25,70 
EU share in the turnover of the top 45 world companies 21,10 
EU share in top world consumer good companies 17,10 
EU share in top world defense/aeronautic industries 16,80 
EU share in top world mass communication companies 10,10 
EU share in top world informatic companies 0,00 
 
Legend: Our own calculations from Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000 
 
The European Union shortcomings vis-à-vis the Pacific in terms of world export markets for manufactured 
goods, in terms of comparative labor costs, in terms of technological and scientific development and in terms 
of employment are all too obvious and were described in the literature in all detail, the crash of 1997 not-
withstanding (for a debate on these issues see Inotai, 1993; Kennedy, 1993; Tausch and Prager, 1993, IFRI 
1998). I strongly agree with Andre Gunder Frank’s recent book (1998): it is the first time in world economic 
history, that an economic crisis began in a center outside Europe or the United States. The fundamentals of 
the European Union still reflect the realities of the late 1950s and still comprise the following sectors (i) the 
coal and steel community (ii) agricultural self-sufficiency (iii) the customs union. The new international division 
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of labor, that characterizes the world economy since the late 1960s, is the prime challenge to the logic of the 
Union, built around and evolving from the Franco-German alliance of the late 1950s (Inotai, 1993). Precisely 
these sectors are most seriously affected by world economic and technological changes. 
 
Of the 27448 reports, that are stored in the Reuters Business Briefing information system over the last 5 
years, dealing with the word ‘Mafia’, 10652, i.e. more than 38%, were dealing with events in countries of 
the European Union. The agricultural subvention system, an invitation to kleptocracies of all sorts, dominates 
the Union's external trade policy, and is distorting the world market and preventing the poor countries from 
exporting (our own compilation from Reuters Business Briefing). Together in Europe, the electronic news-
letter of the Commission for Central Europe, already noted in 1997: 
 
In the case of common transit, the "archaic and bureaucratic" nature of the system, as well as its 
complexity, was one of the causes of these abuses, and Parliament as well as the European Commis-
sion recognized this. (...) The common transit system was extended to the Visegrad countries without 
much political debate, while, as the report by the Committee of Inquiry states, in the future it will 
have to be the subject of a serious political discussion. 
 
A major problem, which has to resolved first and foremost, is Germany's apparent inability to comprehend 
and play its role as a highly developed Mexico in the world economy. Similar in population size to that of 
Mexico, and with a share of roughly only 8% of world GNP, Germany's first and foremost role would be 
that of a highly specialized trade and current account surplus economy in the heart of a Europe, oriented 
towards the West and towards the Atlantic and the Pacific, still the major centers of the world economy. 
Germany is estimated - via its share of Brussels expenditures - to have spent up to $bn 30 thousand million 
alone to prop up in vain - in concert with the other Europeans - the Italian Lira on Black Friday, 1993. In 
that disaster year, Germany poured another 9.1 thousand million $ down another sink - this time German aid 
to Russia. Insiders estimate, that only 10% of Western aid to Russia reached its targets. How Germany pro-
jected in vain her dreams to become a democratic 'Weltmacht' (world power) is to be judged from the fact, 
that it took over 43.7% of the burden of reconstruction of former communism - from Frankfurt at the Oder 
to Wladiwostock during the period 1990-1993. If Lohengrin only were to be an economist, after all: 
Germany's official and private Eastern flows amounted to 32.7 thousand million $, out of a total of 74.8 
thousand million $ (our own compilations from OECD, GD (95) 41: 'Aid and other resource flows to the 
Central and Eastern European countries and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union 
in 1992 and 1993', Paris 1995). But the foundations of Germany's dreams to become a Weltmacht were 
shaky indeed, as the meager position of Germany's transnational corporations vis-à-vis their international 
competitors, and the losses of even companies like Mercedes-Daimler-Benz to the tune of more than 1 
thousand million $ and the economic malaise in the middle of 1990s all too clearly showed. Only of lately, 
German transnationals could recover some of their positions (Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000). Add to 
this the disaster of the Mercedes Smart car, developed at great costs, but practically knocked off from the 
market by a single test series of an automobile magazine in Sweden. $bn 700 for German unification, 
DEMbn 160 for Russia’s pullout from East Germany - enough is enough. For the transformation countries 
nearer to the European center, such economic management means lost opportunities to stabilize democracy 
at a vital moment of world history: the Polish GNP amounted to just 75 thousand million $ in 1992 and is 
today $bn 157.0 (UNDP, 1995; Malcolm, 1995; Business Central Europe, April 2000), viz. only about 
five times the sum that Germany lost in the casino of world finances in 1993. Germany with its current ac-
count balance of $bn - 13.8 in 1996, $bn - 4.0 in 1997 $bn - 4.2 in 1998, $bn - 1.1 in 1999 and $bn +2.6 
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in 2000 is in a too weak position to be the European ‘growth engine’ anymore (Le Monde, Bilan du 
Monde, 2000):  
 
Graph 22: current account balances in the world system, 1996/97, in millions of $  
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Legend: current account balances in the world system, 1996/97, in millions of $; compiled from the interna-
tional press 
 
According to our analysis, the terraferma-type of economic interest groups and philosophy is in the last 
resort responsible for the stagnation and mismanagement, that led - among others - to the unprecedented 
resignation of the entire Commission of the European Union in 1999: 
 
Graph 23: the structure of world trade (in % of total world trade; for the ‘triad’ of Asia, North America, and 
Europe: percentage of regional per total trade of the ‘triad’ countries) 
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Legend: intra-triad trade in percent of total triad trade and international trade in % of total world trade. 
Sources for the above graphs: current Account Balances, 1997. Compiled from Economist, June 7th - 13th 
1997, and world trade statistics in Le Monde, 1998: Le Bilan du Monde. Paris: Le Monde 
 
From an analytical viewpoint, one might even maintain that western Europe betrayed the chance of transfor-
mation in the East by dumping highly subventioned agricultural products on the Eastern markets and by pro-
longing the explicit and implicit trade barriers against Eastern exports, especially in agriculture. At any rate, 
East Central Europe did not receive the economic support it needed during the crucial transformation years: 
 
Table 15: did Western Europe betray Eastern Europe at the finest hour? 
 
the Eastern current account balance in $m 
 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Cumula-
ted, 
1990-
1998 
 
Bulgaria -1180 -406 -801 -1386 -203 -59 117 433 -252 -3737 
Croatia 1053 -589 823 599,8 785,9 -1283,2 -880,8 -2434,9 -1553,8 -3480 
Czech 
Republic 
-900 300 -305,1 114,6 -49,7 -1362,3 -4292,2 -3155,8 -1000 -10651 
Estonia  36,1 21,6 -166,5 -157,9 -397,9 -563,4 -478,1 -1706,1 
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Hungary 127 267 324 -3455 -3911 -2480 -1678 -981 -2300 -14087 
Latvia  25 314 -9 -159 -217 -345 -713 -1104 
Lithuania  203 -85,7 -94 -614,4 -722,6 -981,3 -1298 -3593 
Poland 600 -2000 900 -600 2300 5500 -1300 -4268 -6800 -5668 
Romania  -1290 -1518 -1239 -516 -1732 -2600 -2159 -3019 -14073 
Slovakia -767 -768 173 -601,2 664,9 391,4 -2098,1 -1952,3 -2059,2 -7016,5 
Slovenia 0,5 131 926 192 600,1 -22,8 39 36,6 -3,8 1898,6 
Ukraine  -2900 -600 -800 -1400 -1200 -1100 -1500 -1200 -10700 
 
Total, 12 
trans-
forma-
tion 
countries 
-1066,5 -7255 186 -6924,9 -1998,3 -3179,2 -15131 -17871 -20677 -73917 
 
 
the Eastern trade balance in $bn 
 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Cumula-
ted, 
1990-
1998 
 
Bulgaria -0,8 0,4 -0,2 -0,9 -0,2 -0,3 -0,2 0 -0,5 -0,1 -2,8 
Croatia -1,5 -0,5 -0,3 -1 -0,9 -2,9 -3,3 -4,9 -3,9 -3,4 -22,6 
Czech 
Republic 
-0,7 -0,5 -1,9 -0,3 -1 -3,7 -5,8 -4,2 -2,5 -2 -22,6 
Estonia  -0,1 -0,1 -0,4 -0,7 -1 -1,2 -1,5  -5 
Hungary 0,5 0,2 0 -3,2 -3,9 -2,5 -3,1 -2,1 -2,7 -2,9 -19,7 
Latvia  -0,2 0 -0,3 -0,5 -0,8 -0,9 -1,8  -4,5 
Lithuania  0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,7 -0,9 -1,1 -1,6 -1,2 -5,8 
Poland 3,6 0,1 0,5 -2,3 -4,4 -6,1 -12,7 -16,5 -18,9 -1,8 -58,5 
Romania -1,7 -1,3 -1,4 -1,1 -0,5 -1,6 -2,5 -2,9 -3,5 -1,7 -18,2 
Slovakia -0,7 -0,5 -0,6 -0,9 0,1 -0,2 -2,3 -2 -2,3 -1,1 -10,5 
Slovenia -0,6 -0,3 0,8 -0,2 -0,5 -1,2 -1,1 -1 -1,1 -1,4 -6,6 
Ukraine  -3,4 -0,6 -2,5 -0,5 -2,3 -4,1 -2,9 -2 -0,3 -18,6 
 
Total, 12 
trans-
forma-
tion 
countries 
-1,9 -5,8 -3,9 -12,7 -12,7 -22,7 -37,8 -39,7 -42,3 -15,9 -195,4 
 
Legend: our own calculations from Business Central Europe, http://www.bcemag.com/ and UNICEF 
Transmonee electronic data files, http://www.eurochild.gla.ac.uk/documents/monee/welcome.htm? 
 
 
In view of the present low exchange rate of the EURO and the high prices of energy, a linear downward 
trend is the most plausible projection: 
 
Graph 24: the downward trend in the Eastern external balances, 1990 - 1999 
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Legend: our own calculations from Business Central Europe, http://www.bcemag.com/ and UNICEF 
Transmonee electronic data files, http://www.eurochild.gla.ac.uk/documents/monee/welcome.htm? 
 
 
Strictly speaking, there was not only a transformation, but above all a transformation recession in the region, 
which persists to this day. Only Poland and Slovenia reached a real GDP level, that is higher than the level in 
1989: 
 
Graph 25: only Poland and Slovenia had a real transformation 
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Legend: our own calculations from Business Central Europe, http://www.bcemag.com/ and UNICEF 
Transmonee electronic data files, http://www.eurochild.gla.ac.uk/documents/monee/welcome.htm? 
 
We thus formulate: 
 
 
Hypothesis 7: European Union extension threatens to repeat the errors of the ‘terraferma’ strate-
gies in history before (Venice, the Hapsburgs, Napoleonic France, Germany). One has especially 
to watch the unequal exchange relationships between the European center and the East European 
periphery. Low growth, big government, big corruption are all part of the social problem dimension 
that Europe’s political economy nowadays faces. 
 
 
Several authors, including Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, and Chase Dunn and Hall, too, are also fairly pessi-
mistic about the future trajectory of the United States of America. They cite international capital investment 
abroad in those countries, where profit rates are highest, as the main reason, why the ‘internationalized capi-
talists’ in the core no longer have a vested interest in their home economy. Capital investment abroad be-
comes, the argument goes, the driving force for hegemonic decline (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). Amer-
ica’s current account balance as a percentage of GDP performed in the following way over the years: 
 
Table 16: hegemonic decline in the United States of America 
 
1961-73 +0.4% 
1974-80 +0.0% 
1981-90 -2.0% 
1993  -1.5% 
1994  -2.2% 
1995  -2.0% 
1996  -2.2% 
1997  -2.3% 
1998  -2.4% 
1999  -3.7% 
2000  -4.2% 
 
Source: IFRI, 1998, and Le Monde, Bilan du Monde, 2000 
 
The hegemonic decline of the USA will most probably set in slowly, cushioned by the present weaknesses of 
Japan and of the European competitors. In Europe, economic stagnation and unemployment will sig-
nificantly rise due to rising interest rates and rent-seeking that is enhanced by the way European 
institutions are built at present. In terms of the environment, government subventions to declining 
productive branches (36.8% of the budget of the EU are for the structural funds) will increase 
technological backwardness and preserve transport intensity, and hence, pollution. Economic ine-
qualities threaten to increase with such a structure, and in turn will form a block of its own against world eco-
nomic ascent. 
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Inexorably, the centers of gravity of the world economy will be shifting towards the LDCs, here most notably 
during the 1970s and 1980s to the countries of the Pacific, and after the Asian currency crisis 1997, most 
likely to India and China. The effect of the Europe-agreements between the EU and the countries of East-
ern Europe seem to repeat the experience of Lomé and can be summarized in one word: a massive positive 
balance of trade in favor of the Union and to the detriment of the partners in the East, that leads to political 
and economic friction (Hickman, 1994; Inotai, 1993). A growing number of academic critics of present Un-
ion economic policy maintain that the EU-approach to foreign trade and relations with the semi-periphery 
and the periphery is based on two fatally erroneous assumptions. First, the gradualism of trade liberali-
zation; second, the protectionist answer to the current economic malaise in Western Europe.  
 
Samir Amin (1994, 1997) puts a heavy blame on the Europeans for prolonging the underdevelopment and 
stagnation of their own ‘backyards’. The experience of East and Southeast Asia during its heyday has pre-
cisely shown, that ceteris paribus three conditions for successful capitalist development hold (i) the exis-
tence of a reliable anchor economy (ii) substantial net transfers (iii) free market access to exports (Inotai, 
1993). The failure to realize such a strategy vis-à-vis the Central and East European countries results in the 
growing trade balance problems of the transformation region (Hickman, 1994; Tausch 1998). By enlarging 
the Union to the South, the protective tendencies precisely in those sectors, which are also important for the 
semi-periphery and the periphery, have grown. The effect of this was a growing world economic inefficiency 
(Nuscheler, 1993). The most visible result of this is the high unemployment in many Union countries (17 to 
18 million people in the late 1990s, last time that the Union had less than 8% unemployment was in 1990). In 
the Eastern European countries most likely to join the Union (CEEC 5 + Slovakia) early on, another 
2.3 million unemployed persons  would have to be provided with jobs. Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
which joined the Union on January 1st 1995, are not free from employment problems themselves and added 
roughly another million unemployed persons of their own to the army of European unemployment (UNDP, 
1997-99). To put the proportions of unemployment in even more drastic words: the unemployed workers of 
the EU - excluding their families - would already be the 6th biggest state in the Union with more than 18.2 
million inhabitants - bigger than any of the 10 smaller European Union countries. The up to 40 million per-
sons, affected by unemployment (i.e. the unemployed and their households), probably would form the 5th 
biggest state in Western Europe, only surpassed in size by Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. With around 
40 million inhabitants, like Spain, this 'country' should play a major role in the EU and should one day be in a 
position to take up at least the EU-Presidency... 
 
 
The (in)efficiency of the European Union at the level of  stable western democracies 
 
 
Nollert (1996) has shown that the efficiency of an interest group at the Union level is largely determined by 
the age of an interest group, by the relative efficiency of the internal decision making mechanism, by the low 
number of members, restricted to Union countries, and by the ‘Unionization’ of the central policy concern of 
the respective interest group. The basic democracy deficit of the Union, that is evident in the powerlessness 
of the European Parliament, actively enhances the power of these narrow distribution coalitions. Among the 
most powerful ones, the European Roundtable of Industrialists emerged, closely linked to Etienne Davignon, 
the long-term EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, linked to key Western capital groups like 
Rockefeller, Standard Oil, Asea-Brown-Bovery, Deutsche Bank, Fiat, Volvo, Renault, Societé General, 
Unilever, and later on also to the Trilateral Commission (Nollert and Fielder, 1997). The case of the 
Roundtable shows, that European capital integration is far more advanced than that of its countervailing 
power, organized labor. Johannes Voggenhuber, an Austrian member of the European Parliament for the 
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labor. Johannes Voggenhuber, an Austrian member of the European Parliament for the Green Party, and an 
impassioned - if perhaps not always error-free critic of the ‘real existing Union’ - , has summarized the de-
velopment blocks that the Union faces as follows: 
 
‘The law-makers of the European Union are organs of the Executive. Laws are being passed in the 
Council, that is to say, by Government representatives of member states. Exclusively the Commission 
holds the right for law-initiatives, which is a non-elected (...) administrative body. Its suggestions can 
be altered by the Council only unanimously. Even that, the Commission can prevent this, by simply 
withdrawing its proposal (...) Laws are deliberated and passed under the exclusion of the public (...) 
Two Hundred Years after the French Revolution, laws again go into effect in Europe, which were not 
passed by an elected, lawmaking assembly’ (Voggenhuber, 1995, our translation) 
 
The very center-piece of the European Union is its agricultural policy, which, throughout the ups and downs 
of European integration, swallowed more than 50% of its budget. 6% of grain producers produce 60% of 
Union grain; 15% of milk-producing entities produce more than 50% of total production. 10% of cattle 
breeders possess 50% of all cattle in the Union. 20% of producing units receive 80% of all subventions. 
Such a monopolistic system, Voggenhuber correctly argues, has its heavy economic price: stagnation, 50 
million poor people, three million homeless, millions of unemployed, a threatening and recurring tendency 
towards a growing gap between the rich and the poor regions. Over the last years, there has been a certain 
shift in favor of the South, aided by a policy of soft currencies in countries like Italy or Spain, thus counter-
balancing the inherent internal tendencies of the Union. One of the main arguments for the EURO was that it 
will rule out once and for all such a world economic adjustment; the wage rate, or worse, if that is inflexible, 
the unemployment rate or migration will be the only adjustment mechanism left open for the European mez-
zogiorno after introduction of the Euro.  
We now start our multivariate analysis of the basic problems of the European Union. The basic equation can 
be expanded in the following fashion: 
 
equation (1.2) stagnation and development blocks in western democracies (lack of economic growth; 
inflation; lack of human development; unemployment) = constant + b1 * age of democracy + b2 * state 
sector influence (like state sector expenditures per GDP), tn-1 (+ b3 * years of European Union mem-
bership (like state sector expenditures per GDP)) 
 
Variables: 
 
· agricultural employment (UNDP, 1998) 
· central government expenditures 1985 (Source: World Resources Institute, 1992) 
· democratic age within stable world political boundaries by 2000 (Source: Weede; Tausch, 1993a; 
Fischer Weltalmanach; United States Department of State Internet Country Documentation) 
· economic growth (GNP per cap.) 1975-1998; 1990-1998 (UNDP, 2000; IBRD WDR, 1999) 
· gender empowerment index (GEM) (UNDP, 1999) 
· human development index (HDI) (UNDP, 1999) 
· human development index (UNDP, 1999) 
· labor force unionization rate (UNDP, 1998) 
· Labour Force Participation Rate (UNDP, 1998) 
· PC’s per 1000 inhabitants (UNDP, 1998) 
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· share of consumption of the richest 20% in comparison to the share of the poorest 20% (UNDP, 
2000) 
· unemployment rate (UNDP, 1999) 
· unionization rate (UNDP, 1998) 
· years of Union membership by 2000 (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1999) 
 
Table 17: the primary data for a statistical analysis of the development efficiency of the European Union 
 
unemployment short-term GNP per 
capita growth 1990-
98 
 
long-term growth top 20% bottom 
20% 
8 0,5 1,2 SWE 3,6 
7,7 2 1,8 ISR 6,2 
5 1,8 1,9 USA 8,9 
14,5 1,2 2 SF 3,6 
9 1,7 1,9 B 3,6 
5,4 2,5 2,1 DK 3,6 
10,5 6 4,4 IRE 6,4 
5,2 1,6 2,2 A 3,2 
7,2 1 0,7 NZ 17,4 
4,1 3,4 2,9 N 3,7 
8,5 2,7 1,9 AUS 7 
12,5 1 2,2 ITA 4,2 
7,1 1,6 1,9 UK 6,5 
9,8 1,6 1,2 GER 4,7 
5,6 2,1 1,8 NL 5,5 
4,2 -0,2 0,9 CH 5,8 
9,3 0,9 1,5 CND 5,2 
3,5 1,1 2,6 J 3,4 
12,4 1,2 1,8 F 5,6 
3,8 1,6 2,3 ICE 3,3 
3,3 1,9 3,4 LUX 3,9 
20,9 1,8 1,9 SP 6,4 
6,9 2,4 2,9 P 5,9 
9,8 1,4 1,6 GRE 5,4 
 
Legend: the short-term growth for Germany is the growth of the GDP. The income differential in Iceland had 
to be estimated from the best fitting EXCEL-trendline using the best correlating predictor variable, unioniza-
tion rate. 
 
Table 18: further data for the analysis of the development efficiency of the European Union 
 
 
 age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state 
sector 
strength 
1985 
 
years of 
EU 
member-
ship, 
2000 
GEM HDI Pop growth 
70- 95 
agricultural 
employ-
ment 
unioniza-
tion 
PCs per 
1000 
central state 
sector 
strength, 
1990s 
SWE 83 41,3 5 0,742 0,923 0,35 4,41 91,1 192,55 42,7 
ISR 52 48 0 0,496 0,883 2,51 4,13 23 99,84 49 
USA 96 23,5 0 0,708 0,927 0,96 2,84 14,2 327,99 21,1 
SF 83 30 5 0,737 0,913 0,41 8,39 79,3 182,07 35,3 
B 55 50,1 42 0,61 0,923 0,19 2,63 51,9 138,27 47,6 
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DK 55 38,3 27 0,765 0,905 0,23 5,56 80,1 269,28 41,4 
IRE 77 52,4 27 0,556 0,9 0,73 14,34 48,9 145,01 35,5 
A 45 39,1 5 0,684 0,904 0,3 7,76 41,2 124,16 40,5 
NZ 121 44,7 0 0,7 0,901 0,94 10,36 24,3 222,69 33,4 
N 55 38,7 0 0,81 0,927 0,44 6,28 57,7 273 35,7 
AUS 108 27,5 0 0,707 0,922 1,43 5,52 35,2 275,86 24,5 
ITA 55 46,8 42 0,523 0,9 0,24 8,6 44,1 83,72 44,6 
UK 82 35,6 27 0,614 0,918 0,17 2,17 32,9 186,22 37,9 
GER 51 30,4 42 0,74 0,906 0,2 3,98 28,9 164,9 32,9 
NL 55 53,9 42 0,702 0,921 0,69 4,57 25,6 200,52 47,6 
CH 128 21 0 0,655 0,914 0,59 5,52 22,5 384,01 27,9 
CND 102 22,2 0 0,742 0,932 1,29 3,37 37,4 195,8 24,7 
J 48 16,3 0 0,494 0,924 0,73 7,28 24 152,54 16,3 
F 55 43,7 42 0,499 0,918 0,54 5,49 9,1 134,34 46,6 
ICE 52 27,5 0 0,721 0,919 1,11 10,97 83,3 205,22 29,2 
LUX 55 41,3 42 0,624 0,902 0,73 3,61 43,4 137,6 41 
SP 23 33,6 14 0,555 0,894 0,64 11,86 18,6 81,61 36,1 
P 18 41,9 14 0,571 0,858 0,33 17,82 25,6 80,65 40,8 
GRE 25 40,1 19 0,404 0,867 0,69 22,96 24,3 33,44 34 
 
The final results underline the basic arguments, explained above: 
 
Table 19: the development efficiency of the EU 
 
long-term economic per capita income growth 1975-1998 
 
 
a) the original neo-liberal growth equation 
 
 
western democracies without Spain, Portugal, Greece 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1985 
 
constant 
 
0,007301 -0,01287 2,687582 
0,016896 0,007224 0,953919 
0,197379   
2,213256 18  
   
0,432115 -1,78203 T-Test 
 
 
 
western democracies with Spain, Portugal, Greece 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1985 
 
constant 
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0,010659 -0,00907 2,243991 
0,016207 0,005715 0,816902 
0,160224   
2,003341 21  
   
0,657664 -1,5869 T-Test 
 
 
 
b) the neo-liberal growth equation including the effects of European Union membership 
 
 
 
western democracies without Spain, Portugal, Greece 
 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1985 
years of 
EU mem-
bership, 
2000 
 
constant 
-0,00266 0,009389 -0,01348 2,69851 
0,012356 0,019883 0,007937 0,981547 
0,199565    
1,412818 17   
    
-0,2155 0,472218 -1,69828 T-Test 
 
 
 
western democracies with Spain, Portugal, Greece 
 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1985 
years of 
EU mem-
bership, 
2000 
 
constant 
-0,00077 0,011302 -0,00917 2,239416 
0,011588 0,019224 0,006045 0,839811 
0,16041    
1,273715 20   
    
-0,06644 0,587941 -1,51683 T-Test 
 
 
unemployment rate 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1985 
years of 
EU mem-
bership, 
2000 
 
constant 
-0,0177 0,013462 0,001201 0,399204 
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0,00709 0,011761 0,003698 0,513804 
0,269904    
2,464555 20   
    
-2,49601 1,144583 0,324727 T-Test 
 
 
economic inequality between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% 
 
 
age of 
democracy 
in 2000 
central 
state sec-
tor 
strength 
1972 
years of 
EU mem-
bership, 
2000 
 
constant 
-0,04338 0,115288 0,050859 -1,35568 
0,037499 0,062208 0,01956 2,717631 
0,345025    
3,511838 20   
    
-1,15675 1,853263 2,600079 -0,49885 
 
 
Legend: as in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second 
row: standard errors, last row: t-Test. The values immediately below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, 
left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row).  
 
All these reprinted equations confirm the basic argument, put forward by Erich Weede, quoted above. State 
sector expenditures, and above all, years of European Union membership block against economic growth 
and the redistribution of incomes. We thus formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 8: years of EU membership significantly contribute towards a low economic growth 
rate, and significantly increase economic inequalities. Societies, under the discipline of old democ-
ratic mechanisms, are still more immune against unemployment. The Union, at the same time, is 
like a person riding on a bicycle: standstill is impossible. Without the enlargements of the 1980s, 
the described effects would be more pronounced still. 
 
 
Without enlargement, the negative internal European Union blocks against capitalist development would even 
increase, thus turning the tide further in favor of the original neo-liberal Weede equation. Union enlargement, 
new world political borders or a new political order for a nationally organized society at home would take 
away some of the most detrimental effects of distribution coalition building. The basic reason for such results 
is the emergency support philosophy of the Commission, that strengthens the euro-wide rent-seeking mental-
ity. 
 
Upon closer inspection, also the much hailed development breakthrough in Ireland, Spain and Portugal upon 
EU accession is a myth: all countries in the developed world experienced an acceleration of their human de-
velopment after 1985, when the Kondratieff A-phase set in, while some of the earlier joiners, most notably 
Greece and Denmark, harvested a period of stagnation upon EU-accession , from which they recuperate 
now during the latest Kondratieff cycle upswing: 
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Graph 26: human development upon EU accession 
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Legend: our own compilations from UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 
 
Analytically, we might ask ourselves who were the best ‘accelerators’ of their development pattern since 
1975. To this end, we calculated the linear regression predicted values (EXCEL 5.0 program, routine 
‘Trend’) of the industrialized democracies in the period 1990-98 from their past human development per-
formance, 1975 - 1990. The countries, whose real value was much above the expected developed democ-
racy country trend, were exceptionally good human development performers, while the countries, very much 
below the trend, were bad human development performers. It turns out, that countries both outside and in-
side the Union had exceptionally good and exceptionally bad performances: 
 
Table 20: human development in western democracies, 1975-1998 
 
Human Devel-
opment Index 
growth 
1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-98 predicted 90-98 
performance 
residual (how 
development 
accelerated in 
comparison to 
the values, ex-
pected from the 
performance 
1975-90) 
 
AUS 0,017 0,012 0,013 0,045 0,02724738 0,01775262 
IRE 0,013 0,015 0,024 0,05 0,03622739 0,01377261 
N 0,019 0,011 0,012 0,039 0,02576014 0,01323986 
MAL 0,035 0,027 0,035 0,053 0,04087268 0,01212732 
SWE 0,01 0,01 0,009 0,037 0,02601221 0,01098779 
UK 0,008 0,009 0,02 0,044 0,03321503 0,01078497 
POR 0,023 0,027 0,03 0,051 0,0409859 0,0100141 
NZ 0,008 0,011 0,009 0,032 0,02686634 0,00513366 
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B 0,017 0,013 0,019 0,035 0,03135364 0,00364636 
LUX 0,015 0,014 0,023 0,038 0,03474016 0,00325984 
DK 0,008 0,009 0,007 0,028 0,02498478 0,00301522 
GR 0,021 0,02 0,01 0,026 0,02671665 -0,00071665 
NL 0,012 0,014 0,014 0,028 0,02986197 -0,00186197 
ISR 0,021 0,018 0,015 0,027 0,02926676 -0,00226676 
SP 0,019 0,016 0,02 0,03 0,03236333 -0,00236333 
ITA 0,018 0,01 0,022 0,028 0,03205665 -0,00405665 
US 0,02 0,013 0,014 0,02 0,02736848 -0,00736848 
ICE 0,022 0,009 0,018 0,02 0,02812368 -0,00812368 
J 0,024 0,015 0,016 0,02 0,02815713 -0,00815713 
F 0,015 0,012 0,021 0,024 0,0328586 -0,0088586 
SF 0,019 0,017 0,023 0,025 0,0345703 -0,0095703 
A 0,014 0,014 0,022 0,023 0,03438029 -0,01138029 
CH 0,011 0,007 0,012 0,014 0,02671522 -0,01271522 
CND 0,016 0,022 0,022 0,01 0,0362953 -0,0262953 
 
Legend: our compilations from UNDP HDR 2000 
 
 
The integration of the European East 
 
 
Having contributed almost bn$ 200 to the economic well-being of the developed regions of the world, espe-
cially western Europe, by its secular negative balance of trade since 1989, the East’s intention to join the 
European Union is justifiable on all grounds. And here, an additional argument comes in that speaks very 
much in favor of the European semi-periphery both in the East and the South, and against the ideology of a 
‘fortress Europe’:  
 
Hypothesis 9: any serious indicator analysis will show that the social distance between the Euro-
pean center and the East European periphery is smaller than usually pretended, and yet there are 
important tasks ahead. One of them is the export of corruption from the centers to the peripheries 
via the mechanisms of unequal exchange and exploitation; the other is the overcoming of the raw-
material, environment- and energy-intensive extractive economy of the East. 
 
 
For an empirical test of the hypothesis about the social distance between Western and Eastern Europe, that 
can be bridged, we used the following indicators: 
 
 
· < 1 $ a day (percentage of population living from an income which is equal to or lower than 1 $ 
expressed in real purchasing power parity rates a day, UNDP, 1997) 
· < Grade 5 (children not reaching grade 5 in school; UNDP, 1997) 
· Early Death (percentage of people not expected to survive age 40; UNDP, 1997) 
· Gender empowerment shortfall (UNDP 1997; ((1 - Gender Empowerment)*10) 
· Gender related development shortfall (UNDP 1997; ((1 - Gender Development)*100) 
· Human development shortfall (UNDP 1997; ((1 - Human Development)*100) 
· Lack of modern communication (UNDP 1997; ((Swedish (record) value for main telephone lines 
per 100 people (=68.3) - main telephone lines per 100 people in the country)/2) 
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· Unemployment (conventional labor office data taken from Bundesministerium fuer Arbeit, Ge-
sundheit und Soziales, Vienna (EU countries), UNDP, 1997 (Eastern Europe), Globale Trends, 
1998 (Eastern Europe)) 
 
 
Calculating simple unweighted means from these indicator series, we get the final results for our poverty indi-
cator: 
 
Table 21: poverty in a wider Europe by international comparison 
 
 POVERTY 
 
S 4,13 
DK 5,76 
F 6,04 
SF 6,05 
A 6,16 
ITA 6,82 
LUX 7,07 
GER 7,12 
GRE 7,16 
CYP 7,2 
NL 7,43 
UK 8,06 
CZ 8,48 
B 8,84 
POR 9,8 
SLO 10,02 
HUN 10,48 
SLK 10,64 
ESP 11,42 
IRE 12,19 
PL 12,76 
BUL 16,04 
EST 16,72 
LAT 17,52 
ROM 18,13 
LIT 19,13 
 
Source: our own calculations from the sources, mentioned above 
 
Faced with a growing trilateral competition between economic power blocs (Japan + Pacific/USA/Europe), 
that could even one day become a bilateral competition between the Pacific and an expanded Europe, the 
danger arises, that the losers in the trilateral economic power struggle are unable to provide their 'spheres of 
influence' with the kind of advantageous economic relationships, that would be necessary to be able to 
break the deadlock of semi-peripherization and partial underdevelopment in regions like Latin America, Af-
rica and Eastern Europe. Germany in particular will assert with all means possible its own backyard ‘sphere 
of influence’ in East Central Europe.  
 
Instead of letting ‘them’ participate in global welfare, the existence of such exploitative  power blocs - and 
not the vicissitudes of the ‘East’ or ‘South Europeans’ or ‘Latin Americans’ or ‘Asians’ or ‘Africans’ will 
create the conditions, so that corruption and crime in the East and South of the world system persist also: 
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Table 22: the chains of international exploitation 
 
 
 Exploitation - 
Concept 1 - 
Monopoly of 
Capital: Cur-
rent Account 
Balance in 
$bn, 1997 
 
Exploitation - 
Concept 2 - 
Unequal Ex-
change, gains 
or losses in 
$bn, 1995 
Net position in 
the chain of 
the two exploi-
tation struc-
tures 
Freedom from 
Corruption 
Index - Trans-
parency Inter-
national 
Japan 94,35 521,40 615,75 6,00 
USA -155,38 442,24 286,87 7,50 
Germany -2,77 240,99 238,22 8,00 
France 39,47 95,31 134,78 6,60 
Italy 33,42 64,50 97,93 4,70 
NL 21,99 64,97 86,96 9,00 
UK 10,30 61,57 71,87 8,60 
Belgium 13,94 35,53 49,47 5,30 
Switzerland 23,71 20,25 43,97 8,90 
South Korea -8,17 44,38 36,22 3,80 
Spain 2,49 29,42 31,91 6,60 
Sweden 7,30 15,46 22,76 9,40 
Canada -9,26 28,43 19,17 9,20 
Singapore 14,80 3,42 18,22 9,10 
Austria -5,00 19,37 14,37 7,60 
Australia -12,59 19,95 7,35 8,70 
Ukraine -1,34 -0,87 -2,21 2,60 
Slovakia -1,36 -1,25 -2,61 3,70 
Bulgaria 0,43 -6,08 -5,65 3,30 
Hungary -0,98 -6,68 -7,67 5,20 
Greece -4,86 -3,72 -8,58 4,90 
Argentina -9,43 -1,05 -10,48 3,00 
Romania -2,34 -9,87 -12,21 3,30 
Turkey -2,68 -16,48 -19,16 3,60 
Czech R -3,27 -18,40 -21,67 4,60 
Poland -5,74 -19,89 -25,63 4,20 
Russia 2,57 -32,56 -29,99 2,40 
Philippines -4,35 -25,73 -30,08 3,60 
Nigeria 0,52 -49,72 -49,20 1,60 
Brazil -33,84 -24,10 -57,94 4,10 
India -5,81 -56,23 -62,04 2,90 
Malaysia -4,79 -61,97 -66,76 5,10 
Thailand -3,02 -63,97 -66,99 3,20 
Mexico -7,45 -84,11 -91,56 3,40 
Indonesia -4,89 -98,67 -103,56 1,70 
China 29,72 -351,81 -322,09 3,40 
 
Legend: Unequal exchange is - according to G. Koehler - defined here in the following fashion: 
 
In order to determine the relative value of one currency in comparison with another, two conflicting concepts and 
measurement procedures exist, namely: 
(1) currency exchange rates between two countries (i.e., the rates at which units of one currency are exchanged for 
units of another currency; e.g., how many dollars do I get for 100 rupees; how many rupees do I get for 100 dollars? 
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etc.); and 
(2) purchasing power parity rates (PPP rates) between two countries (i.e., the ratio of the purchasing power of money 
in countries A and B; e.g., how much money do I need in order to buy a pair of shoes in country A; and how much money 
do I need in order to buy an equivalent pair of shoes in country B?). 
The proposed estimation method is, as follows: (a) calculate the distortion factor d (see above, exchange rate deviation 
index); and (b) apply it to the volume of trade, giving (c) the loss or gain due to unequal exchange, according to the 
formula: 
T = d*X - X 
where: 
T = magnitude of unrecorded transfer (loss or gain) due to unequal exchange 
X = volume of exports from a low-wage country to high-wage countries, and 
d = the distortion factor (i.e. the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the PPP rate, also known as ERD) 
The formula means, in words, that the unrecorded transfer (T) resulting from unequal exchange is equal to the difference 
between the fair value of the export (d * X) and the unfair (actual) value of the export (X). For low-wage countries this 
magnitude T is a loss. For high-wage countries the same magnitude T is a gain. 
 
Sources: our own compilations from World Bank, World Development Report, 1999; Gernot Koehler and 
Arno Tausch (2000); and Transparency International - Corruption Perception Index, from their Internet 
Website: http://www.transparency.de/ 
 
We fully agree here with recent analyses in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2000 (especially Guilhem 
Fabre) who states that dirty money is already 1 to 5% of global gross domestic product. The UNDP HDR 
1999 states, that organized crime  already has a turnover of 1.5 trillion $ a year (UNDP, HDR, 1999: 5). 
Corruption, - the World Development Report 2000 states - is a means to redistribute from the poor to the 
rich in the countries of the world system - yes, but transnational crime is a very efficient method to re-
distribute from the poor to the rich countries and from the poorer to the richer strata. The more exploited a 
society is, the more corrupt it has to be, in order to be more easily exploited in future. Corruption drastically 
re-distributes. But the super-exploiters themselves also become infected by the virus of corruption: 
 
 
Graph 27: exploitation and corruption 
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Source: compiled from the above materials 
 
For Europe, faced with the danger to fall behind in the global power race, the temptation is great to increase 
unequal exchange with its own 'backyard' in Africa and Eastern Europe (Amin, 1994). And in Europe itself, 
the North will try to shift to the South the burden of negative current account balances. 1988, the year before 
the Berlin Wall fell, old Federal Germany had still a current account surplus of 60.3 thousand million $. More 
and more, Germany’s role will also depend on its ability to impose and to prolong the structures of unequal 
exchange in East Central Europe. 
Secular negative trends in the trade and current account balances of nations are seen to be very strong moti-
vations for international conflict. A possible rise of nationalism, anti-Westernism and anti-Germanism could 
receive a powerful ammunition by the ongoing sluggish post-transformation economic performance of most 
of the reform countries of Eastern Europe, dominated by the inability to find a (legal) export-oriented growth 
model, which is the underlying cause of the official chronic negative current account balance of the region. 
 
Even the integration of the 'Near European East' - that is to say, EU 5 + 1 extension, will be a painful proc-
ess. For a long time to come, their balance of trade and the balance on the current accounts will be negative, 
a powerful force in the motivation of economic and political nationalism.  
 
The 'extractive economy' (Tausch and Prager, 1993) is a term used to describe a situation, when exorbitant 
energy consumption is used to produce a shrinking or stagnating, or at least not very rapidly growing amount 
of welfare. Our hypothesis is that Poland and other former communist countries play precisely such an 'ex-
tractive role' in the emerging cycle of the world economy. The structures of unequal exchange determine that 
the raw material exporting sectors in the periphery receive only a low and declining share in the global distri-
bution of wealth. The consequence could be a rising working class raw material exporting and heavy industry 
sector radicalism against the whole project of westward political and economic integration. The hardening 
work of the producers gets lesser and lesser international rewards. 
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The East, unable to reap the benefits of technical progress and being forced to export what there is, is 
thrown back to the old patterns of the extractive economy. No major advances in the energy/income balance 
are in sight. We witness a heavy or even increased reliance of the export sector on the extractive branches of 
the economy, and the inability to change the price mechanism, partially because losses in the terms of trade 
and the 'scissors' of lagging (legal) exports and rising imports dictate that the urban and rural poor cannot pay 
higher energy bills. The result is one more reason for a possible rising tide of nationalism. 
 
Research and technology should be at the center of a development path, together with savings creation and 
(legal) exports. Savings and (legal) exports in Eastern Europe are small compared to the 'tigers' of Asia dur-
ing the heyday of their development 1955-95. 
 
 
The role of labour migration and unemployment 
 
 
Our view of migration and unemployment in the context of this essay is also fairly radical. We propose to 
view migration from a world systems perspective in the framework of the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 10: both global leaders and hegemonial challengers were and are the recipients of 
large-scale migration 
 
Hypothesis 11: unemployment is the consequence of deficient past human capital formation, high 
tax burdens, the saturated markets of transnational corporations, and overaging. World economic 
openness, a sufficient population growth and investment in research and development in the long 
run reduce the danger of unemployment 
 
Hypothesis 12: large-scale migration leads to social disruption and a polarizing income distribu-
tion, outward migration is typically the characteristic of a country of the world periphery and semi-
periphery. 
 
Hypothesis 13: by its very trade-deficit creating interaction with the surrounding semi-periphery, 
the Western European center will most likely induce more migration from Eastern Europe instead 
of less. But in contrast to America and other OECD countries, that are on average world economi-
cally more open than the European Union countries and are institutionally more flexible, Europe 
does not have the institutions and social flexibility to adapt itself to large-scale migration. Still, the 
‘Le Pen’-equation of  
 
more immigrants = more unemployment  
 
is not true. In institutionally inflexible environments, migration leads to more inequality than in 
more open economies, initial inequality levels being equal 
 
The proof of our hypothesis is to be found in our earlier research (Köhler/Tausch, 2000) as well as in the 
statistical materials reprinted below: 
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Table 23: labor migration 
 
World human development rank non-nationals economically active as 
% of total labour force, beginning of 
the 1990s 
 
26 Luxembourg  33,1 
16 Switzerland  29,6 
15 Australia (foreign-born) 24,7 
1 Canada (foreign-born) 21,9 
4 USA (foreign-born) 9,4 
19 Germany  8 
12 Belgium  7,3 
2 France  6,7 
13 Austria  6,2 
10 Sweden  5,8 
7 Netherlands  3,7 
14 United Kingdom  3,4 
11 Spain  2,2 
21 Italy  2,1 
33 Portugal  1,8 
8 Japan  1,1 
20 Greece  0,7 
52 Poland  0,5 
 
 
Source: our own compilations from Stalker/ILO, 1994 
 
 
Table 24: The determinants of unemployment in the industrial countries of the world 
 
Correlations of ... with    unemployment rate 
 
functional illiteracy 0,49 
net foreign direct investment as % of GNP 0,45 
tax revenue per GDP 0,41 
% lf in agriculture 0,33 
central government expenditure 0,3 
energy waste (CO2 emissions per $ GDP) 0,21 
% population aged >65 0,11 
absolute population size -0,11 
unionization rate -0,12 
women in government -0,13 
weekly hours of work in manufacturing -0,14 
budget surplus/def per GDP -0,14 
female share of adult labor force -0,15 
total health expenditure per GDP -0,22 
export/import ratio -0,22 
exports per GDP -0,25 
% lf in services -0,27 
market size (absolute GDP) -0,32 
domestic savings rate -0,34 
total fertility rate -0,35 
annual population growth 1995-2015 -0,36 
R&D scientists and techn. per 100.000 -0,43 
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Table 25: the correlates of labor migration 
 
 
Correlations of ... with  migration labor per total 
employment 
 
involuntary part-time workers 0,65 
CO2 emisssions per capita 0,58 
real GDP richest 20% 0,56 
services as % of GDP 0,51 
annual population growth, 1970-95 0,49 
service employment per total employment 0,46 
exports as % of GDP 0,45 
municipal waste kg per person 0,44 
trade as % of GDP 0,43 
budget surplus/deficit per GDP 0,37 
total fertility rate 0,3 
male suicide rate 0,21 
labor force participation rate 0,18 
weekly hours of work in manufacturing 0,13 
Human Poverty Index 0,11 
female economic activity rate -0,1 
real GDP poorest 20% -0,11 
expenditure on labor market programs per total GDP -0,19 
growth of real earnings per employee p.a. -0,29 
female unemployment -0,34 
population aged >65 per total population -0,34 
unemployment rate -0,35 
inflation rate 1995 -0,35 
long-term (6 months) unemployment -0,38 
long-term (6 months) female unemployment -0,38 
unemployment, >12 months, female -0,4 
youth unemployment -0,41 
net foreign direct investment per GDP -0,43 
female youth unemployment -0,44 
unemployment >12 months, male -0,45 
gross international reserves per months of import coverage -0,58 
central government expenditure as % of GDP -0,63 
tax revenue as % of GDP -0,67 
 
 
Graph 28: Labor migration and unemployment 
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Labor migration and unemployment
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Legend: our own compilation from UNDP data-set 
and Stalker/ILO, 1994 
 
 
Europe is not a winner in the new model of global capitalism 
 
 
Modernization theories (So, 1990), dependency and world system theories (Amin, 1975), and socio-liberal 
reform theories (Tausch and Prager, 1993), were used here for the world-wide comparative analysis of the 
basic patterns of the short and long-run tendencies of economic and social development (Kentor, 1998; 
Tausch, 1998). 
In order to determine, why some nations developed so differently from the others, we used the following 
data-set in accordance with the basic explanatory patterns of modernization, dependency and socio-liberal 
reform: 
 
The data set, based on 134 countries 
 
· % labor force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996) 
· % of the labor force in agriculture (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) 
· % of the labor force in industry (see: labor force agriculture) 
· absolute GNP (UNDP, 1996) 
· absolute income growth (growth in the sense of Arrighi’s and Amin’s theory) 1960-1990.  
· Agricultural share in GDP (UNDP, 1996; Fischer Weltalmanach, 1996) 
· average population growth (UNDP, 1996) 
· economic growth 1960 - 95, per capita and year (UNDP, 1998) 
· economic growth 80 - 93, pc. and year (UNDP, 1996)  
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· EU membership years (Fischer Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996) 
· FDI per GDP (UNCTAD, 1996; Business Central Europe, 1996) 
· human development index (UNDP) 
· income distribution: share of top 20%  in total incomes (World Bank WDR 1996; UNDP 1996; 
Moaddel 1994; the few missing cases were substituted with the means from linear trendline esti-
mates, based on the countries with complete data, using mean years of schooling and population 
growth as predictor variables) 
· infant mortality rates, 1993 (UNDP, 1996) 
· inflation 93 (UNDP, 1996) 
· main telephone lines per 100 population (UNDP, 1996) 
· mean years of schooling, population aged >25y 
· military expenditures per GDP (UNDP, 1996) 
· state sector size (gov. Expenditures per GDP; UNDP 1996; Weltalmanach, 1995, 1996; World 
Resources Institute) 
· structural heterogeneity (labor force share in agriculture divided by product share of agriculture; 
see labor force data) 
· total fertility rate (UNDP, 1996) 
· UN membership years (Weltalmanach, 1996, 1995) 
· violation of political rights (1, democracy, to 7, dictatorship) (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 
1996, based on Freedom House) 
· violations of civil rights (see political rights) 
· war years (from D. Smith, 1997) 
· years of Communist Rule (Autorenkollektiv; Weltalmanach) 
 
 
The results are fairly consistent with earlier research findings and again confirm the dangers for the European 
political economy, described above. Only the most important results in the context of this volume are men-
tioned here. First of all, MNC penetration (UNCTAD measure, 1985), traditionally high in EU Europe, 
significantly lowers the human development index, and increases - ceteris paribus - infant mortality, 
and - as we show below, is also related to early death (percentage of people dying before age 40). 
Both the saturation effects of Europe’s ‘mature capitalism’ with a high labor force participation rate as well 
as it’s semi-periphery capitalism’s blocked rural transformation (Spain, Greece, Southern Italy) are respon-
sible for slow economic growth. Countries with a large labor force participation ratio (the saturation effect of 
mature capitalism), and hence, a relatively smaller industrial de-facto reserve army of employment, grow 
slower than countries at the middle income level with a still larger industrial reserve army. Neoclassical the-
ory would mention here wage flexibility in the urban sector as one of the main underlying processes. But on 
the other hand, predominantly rural societies at the present stage of globalization are being negatively 
affected by the ongoing urban bias in world development (M. Lipton).  
Another factor works against a European growth model. Especially those countries, that were once or still 
are characterized by big landholding and or extensive agriculture, implanted in the world system during the 
Long 16th Century, like most of the nations of the world’s East and South are still doomed to veryslow eco-
nomic growth, slow human development, and relatively higher infant mortality rates. Even if other factors 
work in the direction of rapid economic growth, this factor could play a role in European stagnation in the 
21st Century, since countries like Spain, Austria and Poland are also affected by it, and the EU agricultural 
policy could not redress this imbalance. In terms of measurement, all this boils down to the same effect: dis-
articulation, urban bias, structural heterogeneity - they all happen, whenever agriculture has a much larger 
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share in national labor than in national product, reflecting the relative discrimination of the rural sector in soci-
ety.  
Some of the most surprising data from this comparison about the urban bias on a world level are: 
 
Austria  4.0 
Brazil   2.09 
Germany 4.0 
India  2.06 
Israel  1.33 
Japan  3.5 
NL  1.25 
New Zealand 1.11 
Poland  4.5 
UK  1.0 
USA  2.14 
 
Legend: employment share of agriculture, divided by product share of agriculture. For the ongoing debate 
about this ‘urban bias’, ‘structural heterogeneity’ or ‘disarticulation’ see Huang, 1995; Rothgeb, 1995, 
Wickrama and Mulford, 1996, as well as the earlier theoretical advances by Amin, 1976; Cordova, 1973, 
and Lipton, 1977. Our data analysis is based on EXCEL 7 and UNDP, 1996 
 
 
Hence also the negative effect of agricultural employment on growth. The process of bourgeoisie nation 
formation (Amin does not use the term ‘nation building’) before the First World War is also a crucial de-
terminant of today’s growth and development chances in the world system, and works in favor of the old 
members of the EU, but not in favor of an EU, integrating the new countries of former Yugoslavia and the 
former USSR. Those nations, that were founding members of the UN in 1945 - and hence have a high UN 
membership age - disproportionately reap the benefits of economic growth today. The international 
system indeed seems to work like a single, huge, distribution coalition, in which the EU participates as 
long as it’s majority of states are nations, forming part of this distribution coalition. Economic 
growth disproportionately favors  countries with a long-established record of UN-membership. Par-
ticipation in the ‘distribution coalition’ of world power allows still a better access to distributed goods, while 
the predominantly rural or semi-rural societies of the ‘Fourth’ and ‘Fifth’ World, but also new nations of the 
‘East’, now willing to join the EU, are being excluded from the benefits. Those, that have access in the es-
tablished networks of distribution coalitions, accumulate even more economic power. 
State sector size  affects growth in a way, as predicted by both conventional and radical economic theory. 
Again, Europe is not on the winning side. The economic burden of the military sector today also signifi-
cantly and negative affects economic growth at the level of the 134 nations under analysis. Amin’s theory 
would allow for such a hypothesis: the state class, and bureaucracies all block against development; militari-
zation, first and foremost, is bureaucratization; while only a handful of nations might reap (if at all?) the bene-
fits of militarily controlling the globe. The effect of militarism must be further qualified: growth is ham-
pered by high military expenditures, and employment is hampered by state sector expenditures. 
There is a negative employment, and a negative growth effect of monopoly number five in the world system, 
state capitalism and militarism. 
Former communist countries could grow rapidly , but often stagnate, not because they are former com-
munist nations, but because their peripheral state is too bureaucratic and too big, because their reserve army 
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is too small, because their military burden rate is too high, and because their rural populations are being 
discriminated against. But per se, the tendencies of world society after 1980 during the new cyclical set-
up seem to suggest, that a world political experience as a former communist nation does not block 
against subsequent economic growth. Absolute market size is not a precondition of subsequent economic 
growth anymore, as successful island nations like Mauritius show impressively. Our equation determines 
46.6% of economic growth from 1980 onwards; the F-statistic for the whole equation is 8.05, with 120 
degrees of freedom. What flexible specialization has to offer to the megalomania of current European cen-
ter thinking, would be open for a debate.  
Human development, on the other hand, is positively determined by a high agricultural share, and hence 
the absence of what Michael Lipton once called the ‘urban bias of world development’. It is being negatively 
determined by a high ratio of foreign direct investment penetration. Thus, findings of earlier cross-
national development research, most notably Huang (1995) are being confirmed anew. Our two statements 
are very well compatible with the essence of dependency theories. A development, that is dependent on 
foreign capital, is socially polarizing and regionally exclusive. The rural regions stagnate relatively, while the 
rich urban centers are receiving disproportionate shares of the newly created wealth. But ceteris paribus, it 
also emerges, that a concerted effort in only one area of human capital formation - education - without the 
proper health policy effort can also be negatively affecting human development. This same effect also holds 
for the determination of infant mortality rates. A policy of high labor force participation ratios, and hence, 
full employment, less urban bias and chances for rural employment all reduce infant mortality rates 
significantly, while communist power experience, foreign capital penetration and a one-sided human 
capital policy, concentrated on schooling, and neglecting health, all contributed significantly to higher 
infant mortality rates. Foreign direct investment penetration pushes up the labor force participation rate, 
while human rights violations, state sector expenditures and past communist experience all determine the 
labor force participation rate - and hence employment - downward. The effect is of course significant, with 
an F-value of 8.13 and 42.3% of total variance explained. 
 
The most important multivariate results are in detail: 
 
Table 26: the determinants of employment and infant mortality 
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NT 
mean y 
scho 
absolu-
teGNP 
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
viol 
hum 
rites 
 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2  
agr.shar
eGP 
MILEX 
             constant 
 -0,1821 -0,0119 3,2941 -55,631 -0,0743 -0,0998 -1,8049 0,108 0,0249 -5E-05 0,1234 281,05 
 0,2493 0,0652 0,5025 8,4382 0,4299 0,0415 0,6148 0,0275 0,0256 0,0008 0,3029 36,372 
 0,423            
 8,1294 122           
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INFANT MORTALITY 
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0,811             
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As was mentioned elsewhere (Tausch, 1997, 1998), the logic of world development 1932 - 1982 was de-
termined by the ‘fordist cycle’ of production, based on corporatist inter-mediation between capital, wage 
labor and the state, strong and encompassing  trade unions, mass demand, and a thorough ‘etatist’ regula-
tion of the process of capitalist production. The new order, that seems to emerge out of the crisis of the 
1980s, that destroyed the ‘fordist’ model of (state) capitalism, based on mass production, heavy industry, 
the arms sector, the ‘transmission belt’ between state capital and dominated wage labor, and all-pervasive 
state control, is based, above all, on the electronic communication revolution, tele-working, new forms of 
production, and a thorough de-regulation of financial markets. Now, why are the front runners the front 
runners during the growth marathon, 1960 - 1995? The empirical results are the following: 
 
Table 27: the determinants of the growth marathon, 1960-1995 
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Legend: our own calculations with EXCEL 4.0 and 5.0. As in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first 
row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test. The values imme-
diately below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row).  
 
The following variables have a significant effect on victory or defeat in the development marathon: % labor 
force participation ratio (UNDP, 1996) (-); average population growth (UNDP, 1996) (+); mean 
years of schooling, population aged >25y (+); and the trade-off described in equation (3) above. TNC 
penetration impedes long-term growth at the 10%-significance level (significant almost at the 5% level), 
while the communist legacy - per se - is not necessarily connected with a bad growth performance (this 
effect is also significant at the 10% level).  
Our answer is very much patterned around the Irish experience after the 1960s: abundant labor reserves do 
not impede economic growth, especially in highly developed countries, but only under the additional condi-
tion of a proper human capital policy. Capitalism ‘transplants’ its dynamism to the regions , which are 
characterized by a still lower per-capita income, to regions which have ample supplies of labor, and whose 
reserve army is not yet dried up, but which invested heavily in education. Neither neo-liberalism nor a 
classic form of ‘social Keynesianism’ are the model to achieve growth. The mobilization of internal sav-
ings for growth is more important than the inflows of transnational capital, which, in the long run and by their 
very oligopolistic structure, block against growth.  
Why do the populations of the different countries of the world system suffer under such a divergent degree 
of early death, poverty, and low human development? The results are the following: 
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Table 28: structural violence, poverty and human development in 134 countries 
 
 
EARLY DEATH 
(STRUCTURAL 
VIOLENCE) 
 
         
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
% la-
bor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2 
agr.sha
reGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
constan
t 
0,9822 0,0096 -0,0147 -0,0163 1,881 -40,01 0,2619 0,0917 1,064 -0,152 0,0166 195,77 
0,2956 0,0331 0,2365 0,0632 0,548 9,347 0,089 0,041 0,584 0,0272 0,0257 42,495 
0,832            
55,034 122           
            
3,322 0,2914 -0,0622 -0,2578 3,432 -4,281 2,942 2,235 1,822 -5,585 0,6464  
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
% la-
bor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2 
agr.sha
reGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
 
 
 
 
CPM POVERTY          
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
%labor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2  
agr.shar
eGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
constan
t 
1,2866 -0,0245 0,4483 0,1375 1,4639 -36,716 0,0541 -0,0073 0,4917 -0,1826 -0,0249 219,44 
0,5533 0,0619 0,4427 0,1183 1,0259 17,495 0,1666 0,0768 1,093 0,0509 0,0481 79,54 
0,771            
37,281 122           
            
2,325 -0,3957 1,0128 1,1625 1,4269 -2,099 0,3249 -0,0955 0,4498 -3,584 -0,5166  
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
%labor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2  
agr.shar
eGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
 
 
 
HUMA
N 
DEVEL
OPME
NT 
INDEX 
 
           
FDI per 
GDP 
 
Years of 
Comm 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
% la-
bor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2 
agr.shar
eGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
constan
t 
-0,0057 -1E-06 -0,002 -0,0007 -0,0256 0,6026 -0,0016 -0,0004 -0,0195 0,0014 -0,0002 -2,3833 
0,0033 0,0004 0,0027 0,0007 0,0062 0,1059 0,001 0,0005 0,0066 0,0003 0,0003 0,4815 
0,935            
159,28 122           
            
-1,7  -0,0025 -0,7625 -0,924 -4,125 5,69 -1,631 -0,9382 -2,943 4,629 -0,5438  
FDI per 
GDP 
Years of 
Comm 
popula-
tion gr 
state 
sector 
% la-
bor 
force 
ln PPP ln 
PPP^2 
agr.shar
eGP 
MILEX UN 
memb.y 
viol pol 
rites 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations with EXCEL 4.0 and 5.0. As in all EXCEL 5.0 outprints in this work, first 
row: unstandardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, last row: t-Test. The values imme-
diately below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). 
 
 
The following significant influences hold, in comparison to the other dependent variables: 
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Table 29: the analytical conclusions drawn from the statistically significant effects in our recent research 
 
  reduction of structural violence reduction of poverty human development 
 
dependency   -    -   - 
labor force partici- 
pation rate   -       - 
agrarian share   - 
military 
expenditures   -       - 
years of UN 
membership   +    +   + 
 
Source: our own compilation from recent research results 
 
Thus, the capitalist world economy assigns, more than 500 years after its initialization, the length 
of life of the poorest sectors of the population according to an easily discernible process: The long-
run members of the UN afford longer life, the newer nations shorter ones, irrespective of the level 
of the logarithm of income per capita and its square. Long-established nationhood and the position 
of a country as a world investor rather than a world investment recipient country are nothing but a 
reflection of what Francois Perroux once called the ‘dominant economy’ as opposed to the domi-
nated ones (Perroux, 1961). Apart from that, the transformation of the rural sector achieves overriding 
importance. The potential of economic growth originally is enhanced by ‘unlimited supplies of labor’, but - 
as Sir William Arthur Lewis has shown so clearly half a century ago - the backward rural sector urgently 
needs reform, combined with a policy of population quality rather than quantity alone, in order not to so-
cially overburden the growth process. For that reason, our proposed strategy of development does not differ 
from the one, envisaged by Aghion and Williamson - investing in human capital, and trying to avoid excessive 
inequalities. Especially when capital markets are imperfect - as they are - inequality is bad for economic 
growth. Redistribuition to the poor, i.e. to individuals who exhibit higher marginal returns to investments, will 
be growth-enhancing (Aghion and Williamson, 1998: 18). A large share of the rural sector enables economic 
growth, but is a burden on social development, as measured by the variable ‘early death’. The way out from 
this abyss, dependent militarization, or dependent industrialization (high labor force participation ratios), 
provide no long-term solution to the problem of social transformation, because they both impede a long life 
of the poorest sectors of the population. Thus we are able to formulate Hypothesis 14: 
 
Hypothesis 14: there are chances of a policy of capitalist ascent in the 21st century, based on hu-
man capital formation, and the overcoming of the ‘urban bias’ of world development. But Europe, 
with it’s huge state sector, it’s high tariff walls against foreign competition, and it’s large scale 
penetration by foreign capital, it’s slow process of technological innovation, is destined to become 
the ‘Argentina’ of the 21st Century. Also. it’s small future population base and rigid migration re-
gime do not qualify it for a rapid 21st Century economic growth. There is a great risk that the 
European West will treat the newly democratic East as a reservoir of surplus-value and exploita-
tion. 
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Scenario (2) starts from the assumption, that anyway, Europe is not in a position to become a global chal-
lenger. Our scenario is a radical, socio-liberal, and globalistic approach, directed against nationalism, protec-
tionism, and social decay. Instead of accumulating world power, Europe should accumulate competence in 
problem solving, in modeling the future, and in treating better the tormented environment. Thus, the enlarged 
European Union should concentrate it’s still existing, considerable economic and world political energies on 
creating the conditions for global governance and global innovation. Thus, Europe at last would show a real 
greatness - foregoing the concept of power in benefit of the concept of global well-being and welfare. The 
scenario shares with the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer the vision of a fully democratic Europe, 
presented in his speech at the Humboldt-University in Berlin on May 12, 2000 (see for the official version, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r000512a.htm). Of course, a European constitution is 
necessary, as well as a true European constitutional and administrative court, that would substitute and 
enlarge the present legal bodies. Our federal and socio-liberal vision is incompatible with the vision of a 
Europe of nations, which - in the ultimate instance - leads to the distribution coalition building at the level of 
the European institutions. A Europe of nations will always, in one way or the other, lead to a blockade of the 
European institutions - the small nations versus the big ones, the South against the North; the Euro ins against 
the Euro outs, the wine drinkers against the beer consumers, the friends of pasta and salami against the ad-
herents of sausage and so on. The number of combinations is infinite, and a Europe of 21, let alone many 
more member states is simply ungovernable on the basis of the present institutions. Ideas of a ‘small reform’, 
with some shifting going on between the small and the large states, using endless number games in terms of 
commissioners, voting rights and what have you do not resolve the basic conflict and are simply idiotic: Par-
liament must be the locus of politics, and not the counting of the numbers behind the scenes, and trading - as 
before - measure x for support of measure y in coalition with z. Parliament must be strengthened, and there 
should be a second chamber of the European parliament as well - one ‘House of Representatives’ based 
on roughly equal electoral districts, with 1 million inhabitants electing 1 MP (for the smaller states with a 
population of less than 1 million, there must be an exception), and one ‘upper house’, a European Senate, 
giving each member country exactly 2 seats, irrespective of the population size of the country. To avoid the 
kind of distribution coalition building so typical for many European political systems, based on proportional 
representation, there should be at least a mixture of proportional and direct representation, based on the 
present German electoral model, if not an outright copy of the British electoral system altogether. 
 
By allowing for full-fledged democracy on the European level, combined with a socio-liberal social policy, 
based on a market economy, an active human capital formation, gender empowerment, an economic policy, 
that largely ends state subventions for energy misuse and private transport, and an open system of migration 
policy, generally modeled around the existing patterns of migration policy in countries like Australia, Canada, 
and the United States of America, there would be enough room for a real economic and social recovery on 
the level of the European states. It goes without saying, that the insane agricultural policy of the European 
Union and all forms of other protectionism must be ended, in favor of a large-scale policy of ‘negative in-
come taxation’ and a basic social minimum, that at the same times abolishes most other forms of state inter-
vention in the economy. The horrific indirect tax burdens, existing in Europe, must be ended in favor of a 
system of regressive direct taxation, that - on the other hand - is not too regressive, and would foresee a tax 
burden of around 35% for the top 20%, 25% for the next quintile, 15% for the middle income group, 10% 
for the next income group, and no taxes at the bottom and a negative income tax for the unemployed, 
Europe-wide. It goes without saying, that knowledge production and knowledge consumption should be fully 
opened to privatization, with the abolition of the state monopoly on Universities as the most urgent reform 
measure for the coming decade, and a full system of Universities on the market in place, as in the United 
 86
States of America. The central European state would receive a limited amount of the financial resources, 
raised, with 7.5% of European government revenue concentrated in the center. This is very much above the 
present resources, but very much below the centralism of states like Belgium, that controll over 50% of the 
national economy. The 7.5% proportion should be fixed on a permanent basis. Since federalism is one of the 
most important preconditions of a successful long-term development strategy, the new European constitution 
would have to be approved by a European-wide referendum and the national parliaments. 
 
The establishment of a European democratic federal state would be the first and most important step in the 
direction of a socio-liberal world democracy, to be modeled pretty much on the same two-chamber pattern 
(with the UN General Assembly becoming the World Senate, with only two elected Senator from each state 
sitting in the World Senate). The executive organs of the United Nations become the world government, with 
the main agencies becoming the world ministries. The World House of Representatives could be modeled 
around the same pattern as the European House of Representatives, with 10 million inhabitants electing 1 
representative; and in the smaller states, 1 representative from each country. Needless to say, that the same 
arguments that we used for the European case, should become valid on a world level. The world state 
should finance itself at the beginning by a symbolic flat 0.5% direct tax on all incomes, irrespective of their 
size. The highest tax level, that the world legislature could impose, would be 3% of incomes. 
 
 
 87
 
Appendix 
The Fortune Global 500 List 2000 
 
 
 
 
Global 500 Rank Company Revenues $ millions 
 
1  
General Motors (USA) 
176,558.0  
 
2  
Wal-Mart Stores (USA) 
166,809.0  
 
3  
Exxon Mobil (USA) 
163,881.0  
 
4  
Ford Motor (USA) 
162,558.0  
 
5  
DaimlerChrysler (EU) 
159,986.0  
 
6  
Mitsui (J) 
118,555.0  
 
7  
Mitsubishi (J) 
117,766.0  
 
8  
Toyota Motor (J) 
115,671.0  
 
9  
General Electric (J) 
111,630.0  
 
10  
 88
Itochu (J) 
109,069.0  
 
11  
Royal Dutch/Shell Group (EU) 
105,366.0  
 
12  
Sumitomo (J) 
95,701.6  
 
13  
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone (J) 
93,591.7  
 
14  
Marubeni (J) 
91,807.4  
 
15  
AXA (EU) 
87,645.7  
 
16  
Intl. Business Machines (USA) 
87,548.0  
 
17  
BP Amoco (EU) 
83,566.0  
 
18  
Citigroup (USA) 
82,005.0  
 
19  
Volkswagen (EU) 
80,072.7  
 
20  
Nippon Life Insurance (J) 
78,515.1  
 
21  
Siemens (EU) 
75,337.0  
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22  
Allianz (EU) 
74,178.2  
 
23  
Hitachi (J) 
71,858.5  
 
24  
Matsushita Electric Industrial (J) 
65,555.6  
 
25  
Nissho Iwai (J) 
65,393.2  
 
26  
U.S. Postal Service (USA) 
62,726.0  
 
 
 
27  
ING Group (EU) 
62,492.4  
 
28  
AT&T (USA) 
62,391.0  
 
29  
Philip Morris (USA) 
61,751.0  
 
30  
Sony (J) 
60,052.7  
 
31  
Deutsche Bank (EU) 
58,585.1  
 
32  
Boeing (USA) 
57,993.0  
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33  
Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance (J) 
55,104.7  
 
34  
Honda Motor (J) 
54,773.5  
 
35  
Assicurazioni Generali (EU) 
53,723.2  
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